Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry

Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry Existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent’s reaction toward market entrants. This study widens the perspective from a firm’s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment. The hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation. In each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels, respectively, and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor. From the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high-quality firms. In our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high-quality restaurant market in Germany to test the theoretical findings. While the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported, we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Small Business Economics Springer Journals

Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Management/Business for Professionals; Microeconomics; Entrepreneurship; Industrial Organization
ISSN
0921-898X
eISSN
1573-0913
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11187-014-9609-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent’s reaction toward market entrants. This study widens the perspective from a firm’s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment. The hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation. In each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels, respectively, and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor. From the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high-quality firms. In our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high-quality restaurant market in Germany to test the theoretical findings. While the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported, we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment.

Journal

Small Business EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 9, 2014

References

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