Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”

How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba” The issue of divisive referendums, which Professor Frey identifies as one of the problems of “Democracy of the Future”, is a special case of emerging tribalism (division into non-communicating competitive groups in political and social life). This article proposes an alternative institutional solution to address tribalism in both direct and representative democracy. It introduces competition for agenda setting in referendums such that more inclusive solutions emerge; it also proposes the adoption of an electoral system that multiplies the options of the public both in direct and representative democracy in order to further empower the general public. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Homo Oeconomicus Springer Journals

How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”

Tsebelis, George
Homo Oeconomicus , Volume 35 (2) – May 7, 2018
Download PDF
10 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/how-can-we-keep-direct-democracy-and-avoid-kolotoumba-2gVQgaXfis
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice; International Political Economy; Game Theory; Institutional/Evolutionary Economics; Law and Economics
ISSN
0943-0180
eISSN
2366-6161
DOI
10.1007/s41412-018-0069-4
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The issue of divisive referendums, which Professor Frey identifies as one of the problems of “Democracy of the Future”, is a special case of emerging tribalism (division into non-communicating competitive groups in political and social life). This article proposes an alternative institutional solution to address tribalism in both direct and representative democracy. It introduces competition for agenda setting in referendums such that more inclusive solutions emerge; it also proposes the adoption of an electoral system that multiplies the options of the public both in direct and representative democracy in order to further empower the general public.

Journal

Homo Oeconomicus – Springer Journals

Published: May 7, 2018

References

  • The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Brams, S; Fishburn, P; Merrill, S
  • Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
    Ferejohn, JA; McKelvey, RD; Packel, EW
  • Proposals for a democracy of the future
    Frey, BS
  • Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives
    Gerber, ER
  • Manipulation of voting schemes: A General Result
    Gibbard, Allan
  • Veto players and referendums around the world
    Hug, S; Tsebelis, G
  • Handbook on approval voting
  • Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last 30 Years
    Matsusaka, JG
  • Fiscal effects of the voter initiative in the first half of the Twentieth Century
    Matsusaka, John G
  • Has the Top Two Primary Elected More Moderates?
    McGhee, E; Shor, B
  • Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them
    Nurmi, Hannu
  • Approval voting, borda winners, and condorcet winners: Evidence from Seven Elections
    Regenwetter, Michel; Grofman, Bernard
  • The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems
    Saari, DG; Newenhizen, J
  • Veto players: How political institutions work
    Tsebelis, G
  • The Greek constitution from a political science point of view
    Tsebelis, G