Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market

Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market This paper empirically analyses entry by generic firms into the strictly regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial entry model using a panel of 77 active ingredient markets during the period 1999–2005. The results show that generic entry depends positively on revenues, the age of the market, and the number of previous brand-name competitors, and negatively on the number of generic incumbents. We also find that regulation may drive out competition since, contrary to what policy makers might expect, the system of reference pricing restrains generic entry. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11151-009-9214-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper empirically analyses entry by generic firms into the strictly regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial entry model using a panel of 77 active ingredient markets during the period 1999–2005. The results show that generic entry depends positively on revenues, the age of the market, and the number of previous brand-name competitors, and negatively on the number of generic incumbents. We also find that regulation may drive out competition since, contrary to what policy makers might expect, the system of reference pricing restrains generic entry.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Jul 25, 2009

References

  • The relative importance of actual and potential competition: Empirical evidence from the pharmaceuticals market
    Bergman, M.; Rudholm, N.

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