Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
William Samuelson (2002)
Auctions in Theory and Practice
J. Eisert, M. Wilkens (2000)
Quantum gamesJournal of Modern Optics, 47
Kay-Yut Chen, T. Hogg, R. Beausoleil (2002)
A Quantum Treatment of Public Goods EconomicsQuantum Information Processing, 1
P. Klemperer (2006)
Auctions: Theory and Practice. The toulouse lectures in economics
James Cox, V. Smith, James Walker (1988)
Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctionsJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1
Belen Chavez, Yan Huang, Tanya Mallavarapu (1979)
Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kay-Yut Chen, T. Hogg (2006)
How Well Do People Play a Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma?Quantum Information Processing, 5
B. Huberman, T. Hogg (2003)
Quantum Solution of Coordination ProblemsQuantum Information Processing, 2
D. Kahneman, A. Tversky (1979)
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk Econometrica 47
J. Kagel, A. Roth (1997)
Handbook of Experimental Economics
P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, Richard Steinberg (2005)
Combinatorial Auctions
Kay-Yut Chen, M. Kaya, Ö. Özer (2008)
Dual Sales Channel Management with Service CompetitionManuf. Serv. Oper. Manag., 10
V. Smith (1962)
An Experimental Study of Competitive Market BehaviorJournal of Political Economy, 70
G. Charness, Kay-Yut Chen (2001)
Special Issue: Experimental Economics in Practice: Minimum Advertised-Price Policy Rules and Retailer Behavior: An Experiment by Hewlett-PackardInterfaces, 32
T. Hogg, P. Harsha, Kay-Yut Chen (2007)
Quantum Auctions
A. Flitney, A. Greentree (2006)
Coalitions in the quantum Minority game: Classical cheats and quantum bulliesPhysics Letters A, 362
E. Farhi, J. Goldstone, S. Gutmann, Joshua Lapan, A. Lundgren, Daniel Preda (2001)
A Quantum Adiabatic Evolution Algorithm Applied to Random Instances of an NP-Complete ProblemScience, 292
Lov Grover (1997)
Quantum Mechanics Helps in Searching for a Needle in a HaystackPhysical Review Letters, 79
S. Guha, T. Hogg, D. Fattal, T. Spiller, R. Beausoleil (2007)
QUANTUM AUCTIONS USING ADIABATIC EVOLUTION: THE CORRUPT AUCTIONEER AND CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATIONSInternational Journal of Quantum Information, 06
M. Naor, Benny Pinkas, Reuban Sumner (1999)
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
G. Charness, K.-Y. Chen (2002)
Minimum advertised-price policy rules and retailer behavior: an experiment by hewlett-packardInterfaces, 32
(2000)
arxiv.org preprint quant-ph/0004076
P. Shor (1994)
Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoringProceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Pierfrancesco Mura (2003)
Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum SignalsArXiv, quant-ph/0309033
Haoyong Chen, Wang Xifan (2007)
Strategic Behavior and Equilibrium in Experimental Oligopolistic Electricity MarketsIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 22
Kay-Yut Chen, C. Plott (1998)
Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price AuctionsGames and Economic Behavior, 25
J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, M. Lewenstein (1998)
Quantum Games and Quantum StrategiesPhysical Review Letters, 83
C. Plott, D. Porter (1996)
Market architectures and institutional testbedding: An experiment with space station pricing policiesJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31
Jiangfeng Du, Hui Li, Xiaodong Xu, M. Shi, Jihui Wu, Xianyi Zhou, R. Han (2001)
Experimental realization of quantum games on a quantum computer.Physical review letters, 88 13
Hong-Zhen Zheng, Dian-Hui Chu, D. Zhan, Xiaofei Xu (2008)
DUAL SALES CHANNEL MANAGEMENT WITH SERVICE COMPETITION
Jiangfeng Du, Hui Li, Xiaodong Xu, Xianyi Zhou, R. Han (2001)
Entanglement enhanced multiplayer quantum gamesPhysics Letters A, 302
E. Chamberlin (1948)
An Experimental Imperfect MarketJournal of Political Economy, 56
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities.
Quantum Information Processing – Springer Journals
Published: Aug 16, 2008
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.