Experimental evidence of how prior experience as an auditor influences managers’ strategic reporting decisions

Experimental evidence of how prior experience as an auditor influences managers’ strategic... We design an experiment to examine the influence of audit experience on subsequent reporting decisions when auditors become managers of audited firms. In contrast to the independence issues that can arise when auditors and their clients are related by prior affiliation, we focus this study on the more common case in which auditors assume subsequent employment with other firms’ clients. In a bi-matrix experimental game that captures key features of the strategic tension between auditors and reporters, we find that reporters who have prior experience as an auditor, particularly the experience of having been a diligent auditor, are more sensitive to large penalties for aggressive reporting than are reporters whose experience is exclusively as a reporter. Our results suggest implications for regulators in predicting the effects of reporting penalties and for firms in considering the effects of CPA experience when hiring for reporting positions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Experimental evidence of how prior experience as an auditor influences managers’ strategic reporting decisions

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/experimental-evidence-of-how-prior-experience-as-an-auditor-influences-nA0Q1kv2AX
Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11142-008-9077-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We design an experiment to examine the influence of audit experience on subsequent reporting decisions when auditors become managers of audited firms. In contrast to the independence issues that can arise when auditors and their clients are related by prior affiliation, we focus this study on the more common case in which auditors assume subsequent employment with other firms’ clients. In a bi-matrix experimental game that captures key features of the strategic tension between auditors and reporters, we find that reporters who have prior experience as an auditor, particularly the experience of having been a diligent auditor, are more sensitive to large penalties for aggressive reporting than are reporters whose experience is exclusively as a reporter. Our results suggest implications for regulators in predicting the effects of reporting penalties and for firms in considering the effects of CPA experience when hiring for reporting positions.

Journal

Review of Accounting StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: Apr 8, 2008

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 12 million articles from more than
10,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Unlimited reading

Read as many articles as you need. Full articles with original layout, charts and figures. Read online, from anywhere.

Stay up to date

Keep up with your field with Personalized Recommendations and Follow Journals to get automatic updates.

Organize your research

It’s easy to organize your research with our built-in tools.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve Freelancer

DeepDyve Pro

Price
FREE
$49/month

$360/year
Save searches from Google Scholar, PubMed
Create lists to organize your research
Export lists, citations
Access to DeepDyve database
Abstract access only
Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles
Print
20 pages/month
PDF Discount
20% off