Executive remuneration standards and the “conformity gap” at controlled corporations

Executive remuneration standards and the “conformity gap” at controlled corporations In this paper we analyze the relationship between conformity to executive remuneration standards, corporate ownership, and the level and structure of CEO compensation for large European listed companies in the years 2007 and 2010. We show that controlled corporations conform to executive remuneration standards less than widely held firms. We also show that weaker compliance is associated with lower CEO pay and more cash-based incentive structures. We interpret this “conformity gap” from the perspective of individual firms and from a societal perspective, with the aim to contribute to frame the policy questions concerning executive pay at controlled corporations. Different policy implications depend on whether the conformity gap reflects a lower need for managerial incentives, given the monitoring by controlling shareholders, or the latter’s willingness to extract private benefits of control. We argue in this paper that the former hypothesis prevails, so that regulators should abstain from increasing the level of enforcement of executive remuneration standards. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Management & Governance Springer Journals

Executive remuneration standards and the “conformity gap” at controlled corporations

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Business and Management; Management; Accounting/Auditing; Industrial Organization; Sociology, general
ISSN
1385-3457
eISSN
1572-963X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10997-016-9366-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the relationship between conformity to executive remuneration standards, corporate ownership, and the level and structure of CEO compensation for large European listed companies in the years 2007 and 2010. We show that controlled corporations conform to executive remuneration standards less than widely held firms. We also show that weaker compliance is associated with lower CEO pay and more cash-based incentive structures. We interpret this “conformity gap” from the perspective of individual firms and from a societal perspective, with the aim to contribute to frame the policy questions concerning executive pay at controlled corporations. Different policy implications depend on whether the conformity gap reflects a lower need for managerial incentives, given the monitoring by controlling shareholders, or the latter’s willingness to extract private benefits of control. We argue in this paper that the former hypothesis prevails, so that regulators should abstain from increasing the level of enforcement of executive remuneration standards.

Journal

Journal of Management & GovernanceSpringer Journals

Published: Nov 28, 2016

References

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