Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators

Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooperation is commonly observed in human societies. Hence, we propose a novel evolutionary agent-based model where agents rely on social information. Each agent interacts only once either as a donor or as a receiver. In our model, the population consists of either non-ideal or ideal heterogeneous conditional agents. Their donation decisions are stochastically based on the comparison between the number of donations in the group and their conditional cooperative criterion value. Non-ideal agents occasionally cooperate even if the conditional rule of the agent is not satisfied. The stochastic decision and selection rules are controlled with decision intensity and selection intensity, respectively. The simulations show that high levels of cooperation (more than 90%) are established in the population with non-ideal agents for a particular range of parameter values. The emergence of cooperation needs non-ideal agents and a heterogeneous population. The current model differs from existing models by relying on social information and not on individual agent’s prior history of cooperation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Scientific Reports Springer Journals

Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators

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Publisher
Nature Publishing Group UK
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by The Author(s)
Subject
Science, Humanities and Social Sciences, multidisciplinary; Science, Humanities and Social Sciences, multidisciplinary; Science, multidisciplinary
eISSN
2045-2322
D.O.I.
10.1038/s41598-018-22593-2
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooperation is commonly observed in human societies. Hence, we propose a novel evolutionary agent-based model where agents rely on social information. Each agent interacts only once either as a donor or as a receiver. In our model, the population consists of either non-ideal or ideal heterogeneous conditional agents. Their donation decisions are stochastically based on the comparison between the number of donations in the group and their conditional cooperative criterion value. Non-ideal agents occasionally cooperate even if the conditional rule of the agent is not satisfied. The stochastic decision and selection rules are controlled with decision intensity and selection intensity, respectively. The simulations show that high levels of cooperation (more than 90%) are established in the population with non-ideal agents for a particular range of parameter values. The emergence of cooperation needs non-ideal agents and a heterogeneous population. The current model differs from existing models by relying on social information and not on individual agent’s prior history of cooperation.

Journal

Scientific ReportsSpringer Journals

Published: Mar 14, 2018

References

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