Rev. Econ. Design https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6 ORIGINAL PAPER 1 1 Yasemin Dede · Semih Koray Received: 27 September 2017 / Accepted: 14 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modiﬁed by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game v,we associate a strategic coalition formation game with (v, ω) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with (v, ω). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported. Keywords TU game · Core · TU-α-core · TU-β-core · TU-strong equilibrium JEL Classiﬁcations 1.001 · 3.007 · 4.005 1 Introduction The core is indeed a major stability notion in cooperative game theory. When utility is
Review of Economic Design – Springer Journals
Published: Jun 5, 2018
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