Every member of the core is as respectful as any other

Every member of the core is as respectful as any other Rev. Econ. Design https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6 ORIGINAL PAPER 1 1 Yasemin Dede · Semih Koray Received: 27 September 2017 / Accepted: 14 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game v,we associate a strategic coalition formation game with (v, ω) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with (v, ω). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported. Keywords TU game · Core · TU-α-core · TU-β-core · TU-strong equilibrium JEL Classifications 1.001 · 3.007 · 4.005 1 Introduction The core is indeed a major stability notion in cooperative game theory. When utility is http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Economic Design Springer Journals

Every member of the core is as respectful as any other

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/every-member-of-the-core-is-as-respectful-as-any-other-bSP096v4e3
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Economics, general; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Microeconomics; Behavioral/Experimental Economics
ISSN
1434-4742
eISSN
1434-4750
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Rev. Econ. Design https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6 ORIGINAL PAPER 1 1 Yasemin Dede · Semih Koray Received: 27 September 2017 / Accepted: 14 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game v,we associate a strategic coalition formation game with (v, ω) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with (v, ω). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported. Keywords TU game · Core · TU-α-core · TU-β-core · TU-strong equilibrium JEL Classifications 1.001 · 3.007 · 4.005 1 Introduction The core is indeed a major stability notion in cooperative game theory. When utility is

Journal

Review of Economic DesignSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 5, 2018

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off