Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process

Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an... In the paper “Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process,” an analytical framework for dealing with processes of political competition is presented. The idea goes back to Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly. To this, basic insights of New Institutional Economics and Austrian Ecomomics are added. It is shown that incomplete contracts which arise in economic bidding schemes, characterise political competition. At the same time, they create leeway for political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and contestability which is discussed in view of incentives and opportunities for politicians to engage in positive-sum, long-term investments in political reforms. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Austrian Economics Springer Journals

Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science; History of Economic Thought/Methodology
ISSN
0889-3047
eISSN
1573-7128
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007816209593
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In the paper “Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, Is Not Organised as an Ongoing Market-Process,” an analytical framework for dealing with processes of political competition is presented. The idea goes back to Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly. To this, basic insights of New Institutional Economics and Austrian Ecomomics are added. It is shown that incomplete contracts which arise in economic bidding schemes, characterise political competition. At the same time, they create leeway for political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and contestability which is discussed in view of incentives and opportunities for politicians to engage in positive-sum, long-term investments in political reforms.

Journal

The Review of Austrian EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 6, 2004

References

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