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Effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the relation between CEO share bonuses and firm performance

Effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the relation between CEO share bonuses and... This paper examines the effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the alignment of CEO share bonuses and firm performance (i.e., annual stock returns). Using 6,583 executive-level observations from 986 non-financial firms in Taiwan over the period 1999–2004, we find a significant shift in the CEO share bonus pay-earnings relation caused by a marked reduction in bonus shares after the new disclosure rule becomes effective. The change in CEO compensation structure in turn leads to a closer link between CEO stock bonuses and annual stock returns. The result suggests that a more transparent earnings disclosure could positively affect board choices regarding compensation arrangements, thus inducing a better convergence of manager and shareholder interests. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the relation between CEO share bonuses and firm performance

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References (82)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Finance/Investment/Banking; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
DOI
10.1007/s11156-011-0272-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the alignment of CEO share bonuses and firm performance (i.e., annual stock returns). Using 6,583 executive-level observations from 986 non-financial firms in Taiwan over the period 1999–2004, we find a significant shift in the CEO share bonus pay-earnings relation caused by a marked reduction in bonus shares after the new disclosure rule becomes effective. The change in CEO compensation structure in turn leads to a closer link between CEO stock bonuses and annual stock returns. The result suggests that a more transparent earnings disclosure could positively affect board choices regarding compensation arrangements, thus inducing a better convergence of manager and shareholder interests.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Feb 7, 2012

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