Effect of information disclosure and transparency ranking system on mispricing of accruals of Taiwanese firms

Effect of information disclosure and transparency ranking system on mispricing of accruals of... This paper examines whether disclosure transparency, as measured by the rankings of “Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System” (IDTRS) constructed by Taiwan Securities and Futures Commission in 2003, reduces accrual anomaly and is useful particularly for sophisticated investors in valuing stocks using accruals. The preliminary results indicate that firms with high rankings show a limited reduction in overpricing of accruals and cash flow and lower abnormal returns, relative to firms with low rankings in disclosure transparency. Given more disclosure, firms with more sophisticated institutional shareholders exhibit significantly lower mispricing of accruals and future abnormal returns. However, after controlling for confounding factors influencing stock returns, we find no evidence that accruals predict abnormal returns. Taken together, the findings suggest that IDTRS is useful in reducing mispricing of accruals for sophisticated investors, but the disclosure effect of the IDTRS may not be considerable enough to exhibit substantial benefit from disclosure on mitigating the mispricing of accruals. The evidence provides policy implications to the regulatory authority in developing a mechanism to lessen the information asymmetry problem. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Effect of information disclosure and transparency ranking system on mispricing of accruals of Taiwanese firms

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Finance/Investment/Banking; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11156-013-0413-5
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines whether disclosure transparency, as measured by the rankings of “Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System” (IDTRS) constructed by Taiwan Securities and Futures Commission in 2003, reduces accrual anomaly and is useful particularly for sophisticated investors in valuing stocks using accruals. The preliminary results indicate that firms with high rankings show a limited reduction in overpricing of accruals and cash flow and lower abnormal returns, relative to firms with low rankings in disclosure transparency. Given more disclosure, firms with more sophisticated institutional shareholders exhibit significantly lower mispricing of accruals and future abnormal returns. However, after controlling for confounding factors influencing stock returns, we find no evidence that accruals predict abnormal returns. Taken together, the findings suggest that IDTRS is useful in reducing mispricing of accruals for sophisticated investors, but the disclosure effect of the IDTRS may not be considerable enough to exhibit substantial benefit from disclosure on mitigating the mispricing of accruals. The evidence provides policy implications to the regulatory authority in developing a mechanism to lessen the information asymmetry problem.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Nov 1, 2013

References

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