Rev Ind Organ (2011) 39:311–325
Economics at DG Competition, 2010–2011
Kai-Uwe Kühn · Svend Albæk ·
Miguel de la Mano
Published online: 22 November 2011
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011
Abstract This paper discusses a selection of cases and important policy develop-
ments in the enforcement activities of the Directorate General for Competition at the
European Commission during the past year (2010–2011).
Keywords Antitrust · Merger control
This report on EU competition enforcement offers insights into part of the economic
analysis that was undertaken by the Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP)
at the European Commission (the Commission) during the past year.
The next section describes the empirical analysis that was undertaken in two merger
cases: Olympic/Aegean and Unilever/Sara Lee. These cases illustrate that the Com-
mission draws from an extensive set of evidentiary elements to make its decisions.
Moreover, the different outcomes illustrate that advanced econometric analysis is used
judiciously by the Commission and should not be seen as indispensable to show that
a merger leads to a significant impediment of effective competition.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of
the European Commission. The authors thank Aleksandra Boutin, Xavier Boutin, Jose Elias Cabrera,
Rossitza Kotzeva, Greg Langus, Szabolcs Lorincz, Dimitrios Magos, Mario Mariniello, Enrico Pesaresi,
and Hans Zenger for help in writing the article.
K.-U. Kühn · S. Albæk (
) · M. de la Mano
Chief Economist Team, DG Competition, European Commission, Rue Joseph II / Jozef II Straat 59,
1000 Brussels, Belgium