Rev Ind Organ (2009) 35:317–347
Economics at DG Competition, 2008–2009
Damien Neven · Miguel de la Mano
Published online: 12 November 2009
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009
Abstract This paper discusses a selection of cases and important policy develop-
ments in the enforcement activities of the Directorate General for Competition at the
European Commission during the past year (2008–2009).
Keywords Antitrust · Merger control · State aid · Exclusionary conduct · Unilateral
effects · Coordinated effects
This report on EU competition enforcement provides a snapshot of some of the eco-
nomic analyses undertaken within DGCOMP, both in important cases and in policy
development during the past year. In the discussion that follows, we emphasize some
of the more interesting and challenging economic issues that arose.
In merger enforcement much economic and empirical analysis has been done to
inform decisions regarding “plain vanilla” horizontal mergers—in contrast to last year,
when we were more engaged with a number of important vertical mergers. The ﬁrst
case we discuss required extensive analysis of scanner data to assess the potential uni-
lateral effects of a merger leading, in some markets, to possibly virtual monopoly. The
second case is the ﬁrst time in nearly a decade where the Commission has intervened
solely on the basis of coordinated effects.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of
the European Commission.
D. Neven · M. de la Mano (
Chief Economist Team, DG Competition, European Commission, Rue Joseph II/Jozef IIstraat 59,
1000 Brussels, Belgium