Does family involvement monitor external CEOs’ investment decisions?

Does family involvement monitor external CEOs’ investment decisions? Rev Manag Sci https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-018-0290-3 ORIGINAL PAPER Does family involvement monitor external CEOs’ investment decisions? 1 1 Isabel‑María García‑Sánchez  · Jennifer Martínez‑Ferrero  · Emma García‑Meca Received: 16 October 2017 / Accepted: 23 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract This paper examines two closely related issues: first, the impact of a professional chief executive officer (CEO) on family investment decisions; and sec - ond, how the organizational context (family involvement and board effectiveness) interacts with the external CEO risk-bearing attitude to affect investment intensity in family firms. Using a sample composed of 103 family firms from 13 countries for the period 2008–2015, our results support the negative impact of non-family CEOs on family investment levels, especially when they are of longer tenure. However, our results note that family involvement moderates CEO risk aversion propensity, increasing the levels of investment needed to preserve socioemotional and financial goals in family firms. Therefore, this paper extends the knowledge on the determi - nants of investment intensity in family firms by simultaneously considering non- family CEO characteristics as well as the organizational context variables of family firms. Keywords Family business · CEO · Investment intensity · Family involvement · Governance JEL Classification M · M12 * Jennifer http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Managerial Science Springer Journals

Does family involvement monitor external CEOs’ investment decisions?

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Business and Management; Business and Management, general; Accounting/Auditing; Banking; Marketing; Business Strategy/Leadership
ISSN
1863-6683
eISSN
1863-6691
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11846-018-0290-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Rev Manag Sci https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-018-0290-3 ORIGINAL PAPER Does family involvement monitor external CEOs’ investment decisions? 1 1 Isabel‑María García‑Sánchez  · Jennifer Martínez‑Ferrero  · Emma García‑Meca Received: 16 October 2017 / Accepted: 23 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract This paper examines two closely related issues: first, the impact of a professional chief executive officer (CEO) on family investment decisions; and sec - ond, how the organizational context (family involvement and board effectiveness) interacts with the external CEO risk-bearing attitude to affect investment intensity in family firms. Using a sample composed of 103 family firms from 13 countries for the period 2008–2015, our results support the negative impact of non-family CEOs on family investment levels, especially when they are of longer tenure. However, our results note that family involvement moderates CEO risk aversion propensity, increasing the levels of investment needed to preserve socioemotional and financial goals in family firms. Therefore, this paper extends the knowledge on the determi - nants of investment intensity in family firms by simultaneously considering non- family CEO characteristics as well as the organizational context variables of family firms. Keywords Family business · CEO · Investment intensity · Family involvement · Governance JEL Classification M · M12 * Jennifer

Journal

Review of Managerial ScienceSpringer Journals

Published: May 29, 2018

References

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