This paper investigates whether fleeting orders account for market illiquidity. By discussing relevant trading strategies, our study suggests that fleeting orders serve for market making and contribute to market liquidity. Moreover, fleeting orders do not distort price accuracy and are not the outcome of illegal manipulation. We then empirically examine fleeting orders using a NASDAQ ITCH dataset. Our results indicate that fleeting orders have very small effects on market illiquidity and account for neither the amplification of price impact nor the decrease of revenues to liquidity providers. In summary, fleeting orders are not the trigger of market illiquidity and thus should not be considered as “spoofing” defined by the Dodd–Frank Act.
Electronic Commerce Research – Springer Journals
Published: Nov 22, 2017
It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.
Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.
All for just $49/month
Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly
Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.
All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.
“Whoa! It’s like Spotify but for academic articles.”@Phil_Robichaud