Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs

Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs This study examines the market value of REIT dividends conditional on transparency of operating structure and effectiveness of boards. Results suggest that total, mandatory and discretionary dividends are valued by the market. Consistent with agency cost theory, results provide some evidence that discretionary dividends paid by REITs with greater principal-agent conflicts have greater market value. Specific results suggest an increased value of excess dividends paid by firms with more complex organizational structures (UPREITs) and, to some degree, less independent boards. This evidence implies the equity market recognizes REITs’ substitution of discretionary dividends for stronger governance. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Springer Journals
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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Regional/Spatial Science; Finance/Investment/Banking
ISSN
0895-5638
eISSN
1573-045X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11146-011-9314-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study examines the market value of REIT dividends conditional on transparency of operating structure and effectiveness of boards. Results suggest that total, mandatory and discretionary dividends are valued by the market. Consistent with agency cost theory, results provide some evidence that discretionary dividends paid by REITs with greater principal-agent conflicts have greater market value. Specific results suggest an increased value of excess dividends paid by firms with more complex organizational structures (UPREITs) and, to some degree, less independent boards. This evidence implies the equity market recognizes REITs’ substitution of discretionary dividends for stronger governance.

Journal

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: May 3, 2011

References

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