Discussion of “equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting”

Discussion of “equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod... Dutta and Fan (Rev Account Stud, 2014), this issue, study the implications of earnings management on managerial compensation, in a two-period LEN setting. They analyze the level as well as the evolution of compensation. Furthermore, they consider the possibility of joint moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I discuss the empirical implications of their analysis, in the context of a slightly more general dynamic setting, and examine the robustness of some of their results with respect to the assumption that the principal can enforce claw-backs. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Discussion of “equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting”

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Accounting/Auditing; Finance/Investment/Banking; Public Finance & Economics
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11142-014-9287-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Dutta and Fan (Rev Account Stud, 2014), this issue, study the implications of earnings management on managerial compensation, in a two-period LEN setting. They analyze the level as well as the evolution of compensation. Furthermore, they consider the possibility of joint moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I discuss the empirical implications of their analysis, in the context of a slightly more general dynamic setting, and examine the robustness of some of their results with respect to the assumption that the principal can enforce claw-backs.

Journal

Review of Accounting StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: May 18, 2014

References

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