Discussion of “Earnings Management and the RevelationPrinciple”

Discussion of “Earnings Management and the RevelationPrinciple” Review of Accounting Studies, 3, 35–40 (1998) ° c 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. Manufactured in The Netherlands. Discussion of “Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle” AMIR ZIV az50@columbia.edu Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027 Arya, Glover, and Sunder (AGS) contribute to the earnings management literature along two dimensions. First, they classify existing explanations for earnings manipulation, based on the assumption of the revelation principle that is violated. Second, they introduce a model where allowing a manager to manipulate earnings serves as a commitment device. They show that both the owners and the manager can benefit from earnings management (a Pareto improvement). My discussion first deals with the general phenomenon of earnings management and then with the specifics of the AGS model. The stated goal of financial reporting is to provide information for decision making pur- poses. Decision makers are not a homogeneous group, and in particular, include both insiders and outsiders, who may have different informational needs (see Beaver, 1998). An accounting system cannot disclose all possible relevant information. Financial statements can contain only an aggregated summary of the large number of transactions that have ac- tually occurred during the period. As a result, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Discussion of “Earnings Management and the RevelationPrinciple”

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Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1009668031268
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

References

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