Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency

Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency Exp Econ https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9575-2 ORIGINAL PAPER Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency 1 2 3 • • Bernd Irlenbusch Rainer Michael Rilke Gari Walkowitz Received: 10 December 2013 / Revised: 4 April 2018 / Accepted: 23 April 2018 Economic Science Association 2018 Abstract We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum con- tribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Experimental Economics Springer Journals

Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Economic Science Association
Subject
Economics; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Microeconomics; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
1386-4157
eISSN
1573-6938
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10683-018-9575-2
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Exp Econ https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9575-2 ORIGINAL PAPER Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency 1 2 3 • • Bernd Irlenbusch Rainer Michael Rilke Gari Walkowitz Received: 10 December 2013 / Revised: 4 April 2018 / Accepted: 23 April 2018 Economic Science Association 2018 Abstract We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum con- tribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen

Journal

Experimental EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 6, 2018

References

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