Core equivalences for equilibria supported by non-linear prices

Core equivalences for equilibria supported by non-linear prices The goal of this paper is to provide some new cooperative characterizations and optimality properties of competitive equilibria supported by non-linear prices. The general framework is that of economies whose commodity space is an ordered topological vector space which need not be a vector lattice. The central notion of equilibrium is the one of personalized equilibrium introduced by Aliprantis et al. (J Econ Theory 100:22–72, 2001). Following Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia (J Math Econ 44:697–706, 2008), the veto power of the grand coalition is exploited in the original economy and in a suitable family of economies associated to the original one. The use of Aubin coalitions allows us to connect results with the arbitrage free condition due to non-linear supporting prices. The use of rational allocations allows us to dispense with Lyapunov convexity theorem. Applications are provided in connection with strategic market games and economies with asymmetric information. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Positivity Springer Journals

Core equivalences for equilibria supported by non-linear prices

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer Basel AG
Subject
Mathematics; Fourier Analysis; Operator Theory; Potential Theory; Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control; Optimization; Econometrics
ISSN
1385-1292
eISSN
1572-9281
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11117-012-0195-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to provide some new cooperative characterizations and optimality properties of competitive equilibria supported by non-linear prices. The general framework is that of economies whose commodity space is an ordered topological vector space which need not be a vector lattice. The central notion of equilibrium is the one of personalized equilibrium introduced by Aliprantis et al. (J Econ Theory 100:22–72, 2001). Following Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia (J Math Econ 44:697–706, 2008), the veto power of the grand coalition is exploited in the original economy and in a suitable family of economies associated to the original one. The use of Aubin coalitions allows us to connect results with the arbitrage free condition due to non-linear supporting prices. The use of rational allocations allows us to dispense with Lyapunov convexity theorem. Applications are provided in connection with strategic market games and economies with asymmetric information.

Journal

PositivitySpringer Journals

Published: Aug 31, 2012

References

  • Nonlinear prices in nonconvex economies with classical Pareto and strong Pareto optimal allocations
    Mordukhovich, B

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