Cooperative Dynamic Games with Control Lags

Cooperative Dynamic Games with Control Lags Dyn Games Appl https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0266-6 1,2 3 DavidW.K.Yeung · Leon A. Petrosyan © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Controls with lags are control strategies with prolonged effects lasting for more than one stage of the game after the controls had been executed. Lags in controls yielding adverse effects often make the negative impacts more significant. Cooperation provides an effective means to alleviate the problem and obtains an optimal solution. This paper extends the existing paradigm in cooperative dynamic games by allowing the existence of controls with lag effects on the players’ payoffs in subsequent stages. A novel dynamic optimization theorem with control lags is developed to derive the Pareto optimal cooperative controls. Subgame consistent solutions are derived to ensure sustainable cooperation. In particular, subgame consistency guarantees that the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset will remain effective throughout the game and, hence, there is no incentive for any player to deviate from cooperation scheme. A procedure for imputation distribution is provided to formulate a dynamically stable cooperative scheme under control lags. An application in cooperative environmental management is presented. This is the first time that cooperative dynamic games with control lags are studied. Keywords http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Dynamic Games and Applications Springer Journals

Cooperative Dynamic Games with Control Lags

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Mathematics; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Operations Research, Management Science; Economics, general; Communications Engineering, Networks; Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks
ISSN
2153-0785
eISSN
2153-0793
D.O.I.
10.1007/s13235-018-0266-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Dyn Games Appl https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0266-6 1,2 3 DavidW.K.Yeung · Leon A. Petrosyan © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Controls with lags are control strategies with prolonged effects lasting for more than one stage of the game after the controls had been executed. Lags in controls yielding adverse effects often make the negative impacts more significant. Cooperation provides an effective means to alleviate the problem and obtains an optimal solution. This paper extends the existing paradigm in cooperative dynamic games by allowing the existence of controls with lag effects on the players’ payoffs in subsequent stages. A novel dynamic optimization theorem with control lags is developed to derive the Pareto optimal cooperative controls. Subgame consistent solutions are derived to ensure sustainable cooperation. In particular, subgame consistency guarantees that the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset will remain effective throughout the game and, hence, there is no incentive for any player to deviate from cooperation scheme. A procedure for imputation distribution is provided to formulate a dynamically stable cooperative scheme under control lags. An application in cooperative environmental management is presented. This is the first time that cooperative dynamic games with control lags are studied. Keywords

Journal

Dynamic Games and ApplicationsSpringer Journals

Published: May 31, 2018

References

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