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Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections

Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to... Control by partition refers to situations where an election chair seeks to influence the outcome of an election by partitioning either the candidates or the voters into two groups, thus creating two first-round subelections that determine who will take part in a final round. The model of partition-of-voters control attacks is remotely related to “gerrymandering” (maliciously resizing election districts). While the complexity of control by partition has been studied thoroughly for many voting systems, there are no such results known for the important veto voting system. We settle the complexity of control by partition for veto in a broad variety of models. In addition, by giving a counterexample we observe that a reduction from the literature (Chen et al. 2015) showing the parameterized complexity of control by adding candidates to plurality elections, parameterized by the number of voters, is technically flawed, and we show how this reduction can be adapted to make it correct. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence Springer Journals

Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer International Publishing AG
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); Mathematics, general; Computer Science, general; Complex Systems
ISSN
1012-2443
eISSN
1573-7470
DOI
10.1007/s10472-017-9565-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Control by partition refers to situations where an election chair seeks to influence the outcome of an election by partitioning either the candidates or the voters into two groups, thus creating two first-round subelections that determine who will take part in a final round. The model of partition-of-voters control attacks is remotely related to “gerrymandering” (maliciously resizing election districts). While the complexity of control by partition has been studied thoroughly for many voting systems, there are no such results known for the important veto voting system. We settle the complexity of control by partition for veto in a broad variety of models. In addition, by giving a counterexample we observe that a reduction from the literature (Chen et al. 2015) showing the parameterized complexity of control by adding candidates to plurality elections, parameterized by the number of voters, is technically flawed, and we show how this reduction can be adapted to make it correct.

Journal

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial IntelligenceSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 26, 2017

References