Compensation design and political risk: the case of city managers

Compensation design and political risk: the case of city managers Although theory suggests its importance, empirical evidence on the relation between exogenous termination risk and contracted compensation packages is limited. This study takes a different approach by exploring determinants of contracted annual compensation and severance packages for city managers. Results indicate that managers exposed to greater exogenous political risk— i.e., those employed by municipalities where voters are more likely to recall elected officials—are 6 %–11 % more likely to receive severance, and receive, on average, 12 %–24 % more severance pay, but do not receive more annual compensation. Additional analyses suggest that the relation between contracted municipal severance and political risk primarily exists in states without restrictions on voters’ ability to file recalls and in municipalities with strong public sector unions. Findings also suggest that municipalities with greater expected agency problems between managers and citizens offer significantly more contracted annual compensation and severance pay. Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Compensation design and political risk: the case of city managers

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Springer US
Copyright © 2016 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
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