Climate Negotiations in the Lab: A Threshold Public Goods Game with Heterogeneous Contributions Costs and Non-binding Voting

Climate Negotiations in the Lab: A Threshold Public Goods Game with Heterogeneous Contributions... We model the climate negotiations and the countries’ individual commitments to carbon dioxide reductions as a threshold public goods game with uncertain threshold value. We find that a non-binding unanimous voting procedure on contribution vectors leads to frequent agreement on an optimal total contribution and high rates of compliance, even in the case of heterogeneous marginal contribution costs. However, groups that do not reach agreement perform worse than the baseline treatments without a voting procedure. The contribution vectors chosen by the groups point to a predominant burden-sharing rule that equalizes individual contribution costs, even at the cost of the group’s total payoff. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Journals

Climate Negotiations in the Lab: A Threshold Public Goods Game with Heterogeneous Contributions Costs and Non-binding Voting

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Economics; Environmental Economics; Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice; Political Economy/Economic Policy; Economics, general; Environmental Management
ISSN
0924-6460
eISSN
1573-1502
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10640-017-0123-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We model the climate negotiations and the countries’ individual commitments to carbon dioxide reductions as a threshold public goods game with uncertain threshold value. We find that a non-binding unanimous voting procedure on contribution vectors leads to frequent agreement on an optimal total contribution and high rates of compliance, even in the case of heterogeneous marginal contribution costs. However, groups that do not reach agreement perform worse than the baseline treatments without a voting procedure. The contribution vectors chosen by the groups point to a predominant burden-sharing rule that equalizes individual contribution costs, even at the cost of the group’s total payoff.

Journal

Environmental and Resource EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Mar 22, 2017

References

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