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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
- Subject
- Economics; Environmental Economics; Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice; Political Economy/Economic Policy; Economics, general; Environmental Management
- ISSN
- 0924-6460
- eISSN
- 1573-1502
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10640-017-0123-x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We model the climate negotiations and the countries’ individual commitments to carbon dioxide reductions as a threshold public goods game with uncertain threshold value. We find that a non-binding unanimous voting procedure on contribution vectors leads to frequent agreement on an optimal total contribution and high rates of compliance, even in the case of heterogeneous marginal contribution costs. However, groups that do not reach agreement perform worse than the baseline treatments without a voting procedure. The contribution vectors chosen by the groups point to a predominant burden-sharing rule that equalizes individual contribution costs, even at the cost of the group’s total payoff.
Journal
Environmental and Resource Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Mar 22, 2017