Citizen Information, Electoral Incentives, and Provision of Counter-Terrorism: An Experimental Approach

Citizen Information, Electoral Incentives, and Provision of Counter-Terrorism: An Experimental... How does incomplete information about counter-terror provisions influence the strategic interaction between a government, terrorist groups, and the citizenry? We investigate this research question using a laboratory experiment and present two key findings. (1) Public counter-terror spending leads citizens to overly frequent “protected” targets such that it makes them easier targets for terrorists. (2) Additionally, we show that citizens over-estimate government counter-terror spending when they are unable to observe it. These findings suggest that asymmetric information and the small probability of a successful terrorist attack may lead to the inefficient provision of counter-terror. We also connect the findings to the larger literature on the principal-agent relationship between citizens and elected officials. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Political Behavior Springer Journals

Citizen Information, Electoral Incentives, and Provision of Counter-Terrorism: An Experimental Approach

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Social Sciences, general; Political Science, general; Sociology, general
ISSN
0190-9320
eISSN
1573-6687
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11109-014-9289-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

How does incomplete information about counter-terror provisions influence the strategic interaction between a government, terrorist groups, and the citizenry? We investigate this research question using a laboratory experiment and present two key findings. (1) Public counter-terror spending leads citizens to overly frequent “protected” targets such that it makes them easier targets for terrorists. (2) Additionally, we show that citizens over-estimate government counter-terror spending when they are unable to observe it. These findings suggest that asymmetric information and the small probability of a successful terrorist attack may lead to the inefficient provision of counter-terror. We also connect the findings to the larger literature on the principal-agent relationship between citizens and elected officials.

Journal

Political BehaviorSpringer Journals

Published: Sep 23, 2014

References

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