Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Finance; Corporate Finance; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operation Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11156-007-0034-y
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Aug 24, 2007

References

  • The effect of CEO tenure on the relation between firm performance and turnover
    Allgood, S.; Farrell, K. A.
  • Board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance: An empirical analysis
    Barnhart, S. W.; Rosenstein, S.
  • Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership
    Core, J. E.; Larcker, D. F.
  • Performance changes following top management dismissals
    Denis, D. J.; Denis, D. K.
  • Managerial succession and firm performance
    Huson, M. R.; Malatesta, P. H.; Parrino, R.
  • Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
    Mehran, H.

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