Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements?

Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements? Int Environ Agreements https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-018-9400-6 ORIGINAL PAPER Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements? Andreas Kokkvoll Tveit Accepted: 8 May 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Although the management school has been highly influential in the interna - tional cooperation literature, the explanatory power of Chayes and Chayes’ three expla- nations of noncompliance with international environmental  treaties remain understudied. Having developed a framework for examining the explanatory power of treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and unexpected social or economic developments, this paper con- ducts a rigorous empirical test in the context of a well-suited case—the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. A careful reading shows that the language of the protocol is clear and unambigu- ous; indeed, there has been no disagreement over the treaty’s content. Furthermore, statisti- cal analyses show no positive effect of political capacity on compliance. Finally, parties had adequate time to meet their obligations, and unexpected developments explain only a small part of the observed noncompliance. These findings pose a serious challenge to Chayes and Chayes’ three explanations of noncompliance—at least as far as the Gothen- burg Protocol is concerned. Keywords International agreements · Compliance · International environmental cooperation · Norms · State capacity I am most http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics" Springer Journals

Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements?

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature
Subject
Environment; Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice; Environmental Management; Environmental Economics; Nature Conservation; Political Science
ISSN
1567-9764
eISSN
1573-1553
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10784-018-9400-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Int Environ Agreements https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-018-9400-6 ORIGINAL PAPER Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements? Andreas Kokkvoll Tveit Accepted: 8 May 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Although the management school has been highly influential in the interna - tional cooperation literature, the explanatory power of Chayes and Chayes’ three expla- nations of noncompliance with international environmental  treaties remain understudied. Having developed a framework for examining the explanatory power of treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and unexpected social or economic developments, this paper con- ducts a rigorous empirical test in the context of a well-suited case—the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. A careful reading shows that the language of the protocol is clear and unambigu- ous; indeed, there has been no disagreement over the treaty’s content. Furthermore, statisti- cal analyses show no positive effect of political capacity on compliance. Finally, parties had adequate time to meet their obligations, and unexpected developments explain only a small part of the observed noncompliance. These findings pose a serious challenge to Chayes and Chayes’ three explanations of noncompliance—at least as far as the Gothen- burg Protocol is concerned. Keywords International agreements · Compliance · International environmental cooperation · Norms · State capacity I am most

Journal

"International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics"Springer Journals

Published: Jun 5, 2018

References

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