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This article examines the incentive and efficiency implications of buyer brokerage. We show that it is possible to perfectly align the interests of the seller with those of his agent and the interests of the buyer with those of his agent. Furthermore, effort levels can be efficient. This result is a departure from earlier conclusions in the literature that the agent's effort level can neither be perfectly aligned with the principal's interests nor be efficient. The departure is primarily due to the feature of our model that it recognizes the costs as well as the benefits of an agent's effort to her principal, and vice versa. Finally, we discuss the implications of buyer brokerage for the future of MLS services.
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 30, 2004
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