Avoiding Taxes at Any Cost: The Economics of Tax-Deferred Real Estate Exchanges

Avoiding Taxes at Any Cost: The Economics of Tax-Deferred Real Estate Exchanges This study examines the role tax-deferred exchanges play in the determination of reservation and transaction prices in U.S. commercial real estate markets. Taxpayers face significant time constraints when seeking to complete a delayed tax-deferred exchange. In a perfectly competitive market, a weakened bargaining position would not affect the transaction price. However, in illiquid, highly segmented commercial real estate markets, the exchanger may be required to pay a premium for the acquired property relative to its fair market value. Using a unique and rich dataset of commercial property transactions, we find that tax-motivated exchange buyers pay significantly more, on average, than non-exchange investors for their apartment and office properties, all else equal. Moreover, these average price premiums generally exceed the tax deferral benefits investors obtain by the use of a tax-deferred exchange. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications. Thus, for many investors the pursuit of tax avoidance comes at a steep price. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Springer Journals

Avoiding Taxes at Any Cost: The Economics of Tax-Deferred Real Estate Exchanges

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics; Regional/Spatial Science; Financial Services
ISSN
0895-5638
eISSN
1573-045X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11146-007-9099-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study examines the role tax-deferred exchanges play in the determination of reservation and transaction prices in U.S. commercial real estate markets. Taxpayers face significant time constraints when seeking to complete a delayed tax-deferred exchange. In a perfectly competitive market, a weakened bargaining position would not affect the transaction price. However, in illiquid, highly segmented commercial real estate markets, the exchanger may be required to pay a premium for the acquired property relative to its fair market value. Using a unique and rich dataset of commercial property transactions, we find that tax-motivated exchange buyers pay significantly more, on average, than non-exchange investors for their apartment and office properties, all else equal. Moreover, these average price premiums generally exceed the tax deferral benefits investors obtain by the use of a tax-deferred exchange. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications. Thus, for many investors the pursuit of tax avoidance comes at a steep price.

Journal

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Jan 10, 2008

References

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