Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Auditor size, tenure, and bank loan pricing

Auditor size, tenure, and bank loan pricing Using a large sample of U.S. bank loan data from 1996 to 2008, we investigate the relation between two auditor characteristics, namely, auditor size and tenure, and loan interest rates. Our results show the following: First, we find that the loan interest rate is significantly lower for borrowers with prestigious Big 4 auditors than for borrowers with non-Big 4 auditors. Second, we find that auditor tenure is negatively associated with the loan interest rate, suggesting that a long client–auditor relationship lowers the loan borrowing cost. Third, we find that the negative association between auditor size and loan rate is more pronounced for transaction-based term loans than for relationship-based revolving loans. Fourth, our sub-period tests show that our results are driven by the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act period. Our study provides direct evidence that auditor size and tenure are incremental credit risk-reducing factors in the bank loan market. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Auditor size, tenure, and bank loan pricing

Loading next page...
1
 
/lp/springer_journal/auditor-size-tenure-and-bank-loan-pricing-Q2xrQMwpD3

References (66)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Finance/Investment/Banking; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
DOI
10.1007/s11156-011-0270-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Using a large sample of U.S. bank loan data from 1996 to 2008, we investigate the relation between two auditor characteristics, namely, auditor size and tenure, and loan interest rates. Our results show the following: First, we find that the loan interest rate is significantly lower for borrowers with prestigious Big 4 auditors than for borrowers with non-Big 4 auditors. Second, we find that auditor tenure is negatively associated with the loan interest rate, suggesting that a long client–auditor relationship lowers the loan borrowing cost. Third, we find that the negative association between auditor size and loan rate is more pronounced for transaction-based term loans than for relationship-based revolving loans. Fourth, our sub-period tests show that our results are driven by the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act period. Our study provides direct evidence that auditor size and tenure are incremental credit risk-reducing factors in the bank loan market.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Jan 5, 2012

There are no references for this article.