An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures

An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures We consider the potential benefit of obtaining a higher Condorcet Efficiency by using the two-stage election procedures Plurality Elimination Rule and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule that do not require voters to rank the candidates, rather than using Borda Rule that does require such a ranking. We find that there is a small probability that the winner with either Plurality Elimination Rule or Negative Plurality Elimination Rule will be different from the Borda Rule winner. However, one can expect some marginal increase in efficiency from using a two-stage voting rule, particularly Plurality Elimination Rule. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Homo Oeconomicus Springer Journals

An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice; International Political Economy; Game Theory; Institutional/Evolutionary Economics; Law and Economics
ISSN
0943-0180
eISSN
2366-6161
D.O.I.
10.1007/s41412-017-0055-2
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We consider the potential benefit of obtaining a higher Condorcet Efficiency by using the two-stage election procedures Plurality Elimination Rule and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule that do not require voters to rank the candidates, rather than using Borda Rule that does require such a ranking. We find that there is a small probability that the winner with either Plurality Elimination Rule or Negative Plurality Elimination Rule will be different from the Borda Rule winner. However, one can expect some marginal increase in efficiency from using a two-stage voting rule, particularly Plurality Elimination Rule.

Journal

Homo OeconomicusSpringer Journals

Published: Nov 21, 2017

References

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