The theory of the firm must explain howdecision-making powers are allocated between suppliersof capital and labor. Most large enterprises awardformal control to investors rather than workers. Isuggest here that this asymmetry can be traced in partto differences between stock markets and membershipmarkets as institutional mechanisms for allocatingcontrol over firms. The attractive theoreticalproperties of membership markets are examined, alongwith some factors that may account for their rarity inpractice. These practical difficulties help explainthe rarity of labor-managed firms themselves, alongwith various facts about their design, behavior, anddistribution across industries.
Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 3, 2004
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