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After The Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement

After The Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement In this paper, we utilize data on stock price movements of firms indicted on price-fixing charges to infer expectations of antitrust recidivism. Specifically, a return of the firm's (market-adjusted) asset value to its pre-indictment level in the post-indictment period is taken as evidence of stockholders' expectations of a return to collusive behavior. From these data, we are able to make direct inferences about the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement actions. Importantly, we find that the stock prices of 85 percent of the firms in our sample had regained 100 percent of their pre-indictment levels within one year of the antitrust action. Such widespread and rapid stock price appreciation casts doubt on the durability of thedeterrent effect of Section 1 enforcement. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

After The Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement

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References (10)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
DOI
10.1023/A:1011851917409
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper, we utilize data on stock price movements of firms indicted on price-fixing charges to infer expectations of antitrust recidivism. Specifically, a return of the firm's (market-adjusted) asset value to its pre-indictment level in the post-indictment period is taken as evidence of stockholders' expectations of a return to collusive behavior. From these data, we are able to make direct inferences about the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement actions. Importantly, we find that the stock prices of 85 percent of the firms in our sample had regained 100 percent of their pre-indictment levels within one year of the antitrust action. Such widespread and rapid stock price appreciation casts doubt on the durability of thedeterrent effect of Section 1 enforcement.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 3, 2004

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