A Pricing Model for Residential Homes with Poisson Arrivals and a Sales Deadline

A Pricing Model for Residential Homes with Poisson Arrivals and a Sales Deadline We introduce a pricing model for single-family residences on the real estate market. The model considers purchase offers that arrive according to a Poisson process. The homeowner’s problem is to set a price that will maximize his net profit. The selling agent suggests a price to the homeowner that will maximize her net profit, which consists of her sales commission minus her costs. Our model accounts for a deadline to sell the home, a common feature of the housing market, beyond which fixed and variable penalty costs accrue to both the homeowner and selling agent. We demonstrate the behavior of the model and show under what conditions the owner’s and agent’s incentives are aligned. Our computational results suggest, in most circumstances, that agents should not pressure owners to substantially lower their asking prices in the presence of a deadline. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Springer Journals

A Pricing Model for Residential Homes with Poisson Arrivals and a Sales Deadline

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics; Regional/Spatial Science; Financial Services
ISSN
0895-5638
eISSN
1573-045X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11146-009-9191-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We introduce a pricing model for single-family residences on the real estate market. The model considers purchase offers that arrive according to a Poisson process. The homeowner’s problem is to set a price that will maximize his net profit. The selling agent suggests a price to the homeowner that will maximize her net profit, which consists of her sales commission minus her costs. Our model accounts for a deadline to sell the home, a common feature of the housing market, beyond which fixed and variable penalty costs accrue to both the homeowner and selling agent. We demonstrate the behavior of the model and show under what conditions the owner’s and agent’s incentives are aligned. Our computational results suggest, in most circumstances, that agents should not pressure owners to substantially lower their asking prices in the presence of a deadline.

Journal

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 4, 2009

References

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