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This paper tests (Jensen The American Economic Review, 76, 323–329 1986) free cash flow hypothesis using data on real estate transactions. We find that firms with either higher free cash flow or higher cash reserve pay more fore real estate, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. We also find that the agency costs of free cash flow associated with real estate transactions are more severe when firms have lower Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we find that among the commonly used corporate governance measures, only equity compensation is effective in mitigating the agency problem of free cash flow.
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 18, 2016
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