A d -person Differential Game with State Space Constraints

A d -person Differential Game with State Space Constraints We consider a network of d companies (insurance companies, for example) operating under a treaty to diversify risk. Internal and external borrowing are allowed to avert ruin of any member of the network. The amount borrowed to prevent ruin is viewed upon as control. Repayment of these loans entails a control cost in addition to the usual costs. Each company tries to minimize its repayment liability. This leads to a d -person differential game with state space constraints. If the companies are also in possible competition a Nash equilibrium is sought. Otherwise a utopian equilibrium is more appropriate. The corresponding systems of HJB equations and boundary conditions are derived. In the case of Nash equilibrium, the Hamiltonian can be discontinuous; there are d interlinked control problems with state constraints; each value function is a constrained viscosity solution to the appropriate discontinuous HJB equation. Uniqueness does not hold in general in this case. In the case of utopian equilibrium, each value function turns out to be the unique constrained viscosity solution to the appropriate HJB equation. Connection with Skorokhod problem is briefly discussed. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Applied Mathematics and Optimization Springer Journals

A d -person Differential Game with State Space Constraints

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Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Mathematics; Numerical and Computational Methods ; Mathematical Methods in Physics; Mathematical and Computational Physics; Systems Theory, Control; Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control; Optimization
ISSN
0095-4616
eISSN
1432-0606
D.O.I.
10.1007/s00245-007-9011-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We consider a network of d companies (insurance companies, for example) operating under a treaty to diversify risk. Internal and external borrowing are allowed to avert ruin of any member of the network. The amount borrowed to prevent ruin is viewed upon as control. Repayment of these loans entails a control cost in addition to the usual costs. Each company tries to minimize its repayment liability. This leads to a d -person differential game with state space constraints. If the companies are also in possible competition a Nash equilibrium is sought. Otherwise a utopian equilibrium is more appropriate. The corresponding systems of HJB equations and boundary conditions are derived. In the case of Nash equilibrium, the Hamiltonian can be discontinuous; there are d interlinked control problems with state constraints; each value function is a constrained viscosity solution to the appropriate discontinuous HJB equation. Uniqueness does not hold in general in this case. In the case of utopian equilibrium, each value function turns out to be the unique constrained viscosity solution to the appropriate HJB equation. Connection with Skorokhod problem is briefly discussed.

Journal

Applied Mathematics and OptimizationSpringer Journals

Published: Dec 1, 2007

References

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