This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally φs only if the person intends to φ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (Bratman in Philos Rev 93(3):375–405; Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the view, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.
Philosophical Studies – Springer Journals
Published: May 24, 2017
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