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Troublesome trade-offs: balancing urban activities and values when securing a city-centre governmental quarter

Troublesome trade-offs: balancing urban activities and values when securing a city-centre... Background: Homeland security measures increasingly affect urban life and activities. Standoff distance, which prevents unscreened vehicles from approaching within a certain distance of a building, is a widely applied measure when protecting buildings against attacks with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. This measure both is rather inexpensive and has few negative externalities when implemented in rural areas. Unfortunately, sites with protection needs often are situated in city centres. Methods: We apply the so-called Security Function Framework to illuminate the externalities or the ‘troublesome trade-offs’ between protecting a high-value site against vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and protecting other urban values. Results: This paper demonstrates that standoff creates challenges for other important values, such as functional office spaces for all employees, deliveries and emergency vehicle access. Simultaneously, standoff creates opportunities for reinforcing social-responsibility requirements, such as accessibility for pedestrians and environmental considerations. Conclusions: Security measures can have both negative and positive externalities and planning might alleviate some of the negative ones. Keywords: External effects; Design conflicts; Contradictions; Security; Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices; Standoff distance measures; City centres; Holistic security Background improvised explosive devices (VBIED) has increased dras- On 22 July 2011 at 3:17 pm Anders Behring Breivik left tically, both when protecting the current buildings and a vehicle-borne explosive device in the government com- when planning the future government complex (FGC). plex of Norway. The bomb detonated at 3:25 pm, killing Current practice for protecting buildings against such eight people and destroying three government buildings attacks is to combine measures that strengthen the build- (The Public Prosecutors 2012). A reduced presence of ing and its facade with a standoff around the building government employees (it was late Friday afternoon and (Ettouney et al. 1996). Since the effect of a bomb decreases the holiday season), together with the fact that no building exponentially with distance from the bomb, a standoff collapsed, limited causalities. The amount of damage did, that creates distance between a potential explosive and a however, induce the government to examine the possi- building is a very effective measure (Cormie et al. 2009; bility of redeveloping the government complex to enable Gebbeken et al. 2012). the majority of the ministries to move into it in future Creating standoff in rural areas where land is cheap (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2013). and available is relatively inexpensive and easy. Unfortu- Following the bomb attack on the government complex, nately, many buildings with protection needs are situated the focus on measures that protect against vehicle-borne in city centres where land is expensive and annexation of land can have major disadvantages for the building’susers, * Correspondence: [email protected] 1 its neighbours, and other members of the public. The pur- Department of Safety, Security and the Environment, Institute of Transport pose of this paper is to identify and explain the various Economics, Gaustadalleen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway Full list of author information is available at the end of the article © 2015 Meyer et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 2 of 15 trade-offs between standoff and other values, and, where address the risk of terrorism (Gamman and Thorpe 2007). appropriate, to propose possible solutions to such di- Armitage and Monchuk (2009) explore conflicts and syn- lemmas. We do all three by employing the ‘The Security ergies between security and sustainability of housing. To Function Framework’ (SFF), as formulated in Ekblom facilitate robust and effective security which does not (2012), in the case of the FGC of Norway. The FGC of incur unnecessary costs, Little (2004) calls for holistic Norway is an example of a multifaceted project that security where interactions between government officials, requires protective security while being situated in a city security professionals, program and financial staff, and centre where land is scarce. emergency responders occur regularly, rather than on a Ekblom (2005) introduces the term ‘troublesome trade- project-by-project basis. Better planning before construct- offs’ when describing the potentially conflicting re- ing buildings with protection needs would also enable us quirements which must be considered by the designer. to solve many troublesome trade-offs. Conflicting requirements include values such as aesthet- Ekblom and colleagues have developed a four-level ics, legal and ethical issues, environmental considerations, framework, the SFF, for describing a product’s ‘security safety, convenience, cost, and social inclusion (Ekblom function’. This framework was constructed with the 2005, 2012). The pursuit of security involves handling purpose of describing both the rationale that underlies a many such troublesome trade-offs, including that security crime-resistant design and the immediate output of the may suspend normal democratic freedom in zones of high ‘design-against-crime’ process (Ekblom 2012). The SFF security and that security dictates that we should distrust can be briefly summarized (Ekblom et al. 2012; Ekblom others (Zedner 2003). CCTV, for example, can encourage 2012): social inclusion by increasing perceived safety (Loukaitou- Sideris 2006), while also facilitating discriminatory prac- – Purpose – what the designed product is for, tices and can thus cause social exclusion (Sætnan et al. including both security and other requirements. 2002). Security may even replace public spaces with – Niche – how the security function of a given private spaces, such as the case of gated communities. product relates to other security arrangements. Paradoxically, such private security may reduce public – Mechanism – how the product’s security function order by removing the responsibility of the inhabitants for works in terms of cause and effect. the “outside” (Lemanski 2004). – Technicality – how the product is constructed and Gebbeken et al. 2012 argue that since a free demo- manufactured and how it operates. cratic society will never accept a surveillance state, we need passive security measures, such as innovative and Ekblom (2012) distinguishes between different pur- architecturally attractive buildings and landscape ele- poses: (1) the principal purpose, which may or may not ments. Such measures, however, also entail troublesome be one of security, (2) subsidiary purposes, (3) desire trade-offs. Khajehpour and Grierson (2003) demonstrate requirements that are beneficial to the immediate that high-rise office buildings ‘designs with the most users and manufacturers, and (4) ‘hygiene’ or social- profit potential and those with the most safety potential responsibility requirements, referring to other societal correspond to buildings that also are the least safe and the values which the product should not interfere with. least profitable, respectively’ (Khajehpour and Grierson Work within the Design against Crime Research Centre 2003). Coaffee et al. (2009) discuss the visual impact of has contributed to this framework and two projects were counter-terrorism security measures. Visible security fea- especially relevant: The Bikeoff project, whereby parking tures ‘tell’ the public that a place can be used safely, while stands and other facilities were developed to be secure potential offenders ‘are ‘told’ that their malign intent is against bike theft (Thorpe et al. 2012), and the Grippa likely to be in vain or at least will require a significant Clip, which addressed preventing theft of customers’ bags degree of effort’ (Coaffee et al. 2009). Security features in bars through specially designed anchoring clips to fit on can, however, also increase fear by drawing attention to tables (Ekblom et al. 2012). Meyer and Ekblom (2012), the fact that security is necessary for protection (Zedner furthermore, did a desktop test of the SFF by using it to 2003; Coaffee et al. 2009; Lemanski 2004). specify design requirements of an explosion-resistant Gamman and Thorpe (2007) discusses trade-offs be- railway carriage. They concluded that the framework tween providing bicycle parking and terrorism preven- was clearly expressed, facilitated structured creativity, tion and argue that monitored long-term parking can and was seemingly quite practically applicable (Meyer and both reduce bicycle thefts and prevent bicycle bombs, Ekblom 2012). while providing short-term bicycle parking that does not The above studies use the SFF to spell out the design allow for bicycle bombs might be more challenging. of relatively contained products. The FGC of Norway is They do, however, argue that removing bags from a more complicated and multifaceted product. It will bikes (rather than bikes) should, in most cases, sufficiently contain government functions that are essential for the Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 3 of 15 governance of a country. The complex will also be situ- of the FGC, (2) the security niche of the FGC, (3) the ated in a dense city-centre area and its features will mechanism behind protecting against VBIED attacks, impinge on all the numerous neighbours and city-centre and (4) some technicalities of implementing standoff. visitors. The FGC will therefore have some impact on Section three also outlines the troublesome trade-offs many equally essential values. Hence, this study asks: between implementing standoff and achieving other pur- Can the SFF be successfully employed in the case of the poses of the FGC. Finally, section four assesses the per- FGC of Norway? And will the framework help illuminate formance of the SFF in analysing the FGC, and section the ‘troublesome trade-offs’ when constructing a new five concludes the paper. government complex? We reformulate the three assess- ment criteria employed in Meyer and Ekblom (2012): 1. Method The terms employed in the SFF should also be easily The case of the FGC of Norway is interesting because it is employed in the FGC (clearly expressed); 2. The SFF rare that a new government complex is planned in such a should support the users of the framework in exposing dense area of a city (see Figure 1). The government com- additional troublesome trade-offs (fertile); and 3. It plex in Berlin is the nearest example case the authors should help users to produce relevant solutions to the know of, but in that case the city had lots of free space troublesome trade-offs (practically applicable). owing to the removal of the Berlin Wall . The procedural The next section describes the information-collection requirements of a large public-procurement exercise in process used in the study discussed in this paper. Sec- Norway also make it easier to examine the motivations tion three employs the SFF in the FGC: (1) the purposes and the justifications behind all the choices for the FGC. Figure 1 The city centre of Oslo. The circle encompasses the area where the government complex will be situated . Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 4 of 15 The authors were involved in the quality assurance of Results the concept study for the FGC (Minken et al. 2009). The The security function of the FGC quality assurance was carried out autumn 2013 and win- This section presents the results of employing the SFF in ter 2014, and the quality assurance report was presented the FGC of Norway. The FGC involves a vast number of to the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform stakeholders, including everything from the city of Oslo and Church Affairs February 2014. As part of this to the small corner store in the neighbourhood, but this process, we interviewed relevant stakeholders on their paper lacks space to examine all stakeholders’ perspec- perspectives concerning the complex. The interviews tives. The discussion below, therefore, pays particular were all semi-structured (Leech 2002) and always con- attention to the Norwegian authorities’ perspective and ducted by at least two interviewers (for some interviews deals only with other stakeholders’ perspectives when even three or four interviewers). The interviewers took official government documents explicitly refer to their notes and these notes were compared after the inter- interests. views. All these interviews were confidential, so we can- not refer specifically to any particular one (or produce Purpose direct quotes) when we discuss the issues raised in According to the mandate for the concept study (Minis- the interviews. We have, however, included a list in the try of Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Table 1 of all the interviews that at least one of the authors Affairs 2012), a new government complex must be pre- participated in (Berntsen et al. 2014). pared to provide a long-term solution for [functional] In addition to the interviews, we conducted a docu- premises for the majority of the ministries. The mandate ment analysis of relevant policy documents, such as the for the quality assurance is more specific; it says that mandates for the concept study and the quality assur- ‘the majority of the ministries’ implies significantly more ance, the concept study, and other publicly available than half of the ministries (Ministry of Government sources (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013; Ministry of Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). Both Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs mandates specify that the ministries should be located in 2012, 2013). the area for many decades to come (Ministry of Govern- After finishing the quality assurance of the concept ment Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs 2012, study, we collected relevant academic literature and 2013). Since the FGC will be designed to provide func- employed the SFF on the information collected through tional premises for the ministries, this purpose can be the quality assurance process. referred to as the primary purpose of the FGC. Table 1 Interviews conducted as part of the quality assurance where at least one of this article's authors participated Date Topic(s) Organisation 26.09.13 Site survey, security Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs Statsbygg 27.09.13 Security Norwegian Police Security Service 01.10.13 Security Norwegian National Security Authority 02.10.13 Security National Police Directorate Norway 03.10.13 Security, costs Norwegian Defence Estates Agency 07.10.13 Accessibility for emergency vehicles Agency for Fire and Rescue Services, City of Oslo 08.10.13 Accessibility, public transport Ruter AS (common management company for public transport in Oslo and Akershus) 09.10.13 Space requirements, security Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation 10.10.13 Accessibility for emergency vehicles Ambulance and Paramedic Department, Oslo University Hospital 10.10.13 Security Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 18.10.13 Implementation strategy, costs, security Statsbygg 18.10.13 Planning process, accessibility, the urban environment Vice Mayor of Urban Development, City of Oslo Agency for Planning and Building Services, City of Oslo Agency for Urban Environment, City of Oslo 24.10.13 Special needs SMK Office of the Prime Minister 25.10.13 Security, emergency planning, costs Ministry of Justice and Public Security 30.10.13 Security, emergency planning Emergency Planning Agency, City of Oslo Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 5 of 15 The mandates, furthermore, stipulate that the premises The 2014 draft budget of Oslo City Council states that must satisfy necessary requirements for both flexibility Oslo City Council will be working towards providing and security. The premises must be flexible enough to safe and secure public spaces. The Council has therefore handle changes in both the ministerial structure and the established a safety index based on the police’s crime working methods, and must satisfy necessary security statistics and annual surveys of the population (Oslo requirements (Ministry of Government Adminstration, City Council 2013). Safety from both deliberate and acci- Reform and Church Affairs 2012, 2013). These purposes dental harm is, accordingly, another societal value the (about flexibility and security) are not what the FGC is FGC should reinforce or, at a minimum, avoid interfer- designed for, but they describe properties of the FGC that ing with. are so crucial that they can be referred to as subsidiary Vibrant Oslo (Levende Oslo) is a project whose aim is purposes. to increase the activity in the city centre (City of Oslo Interviews with relevant stakeholders have also uncov- 2014). Activity in public space depends on the presence ered some other requirements for the FGC: the FGC of some attractive characteristics, including accessibility, should be ‘representative’.By ‘representative’ they we aesthetics and safety (Gemzøe 2006). In addition, people mean that the FGC must favourably project Norway and use public space when they either are passing through the Norwegian government. The buildings should be well or have a destination situated in the area (e.g. street ven- designed, on the outside and inside, and should be mag- dors, entertainment centre or public transport). Most nificent without being too grand to represent Norwegian visitors to the area, whether on business or sightseeing, identity and culture. The ‘representative’ requirement is a will travel there because they are intending to visit the desire requirement, because it is not strictly necessary, but ministries. But to ensure activity outside office hours, nevertheless is a nice-to-have feature for the Norwegian the area will need after-hours attractions. Will a buffer government. zone paralyze all other activities in the area or could it Inherent in any concept study and quality assurance of help reinforce activity by offering other visitors some- large public projects are calculations of the investment thing to do? cost. This cost focus shows that minimizing expenses also is a desire requirement. Minimizing running costs, Security niche such as heating, maintenance, and surveillance, is prob- The security niche characterizes how the security func- ably also a desire requirement. tion relates to other security-related products, people The mandates also mention some requirements that and places (Ekblom 2012). But before describing a secur- refer to other societal values. These values include traffic ity niche of the FGC, a more thorough look at the risks flow and environmental requirements for the buildings the government complex faces is necessary. (Ministry of Government Adminstration, Reform and The government complex comprises functions, em- Church Affairs 2012, 2013). According to the SFF, ‘hy- ployees and material values, all of which need protection giene’ or social-responsibility requirements should not from a broad range of risks. The concept study mentions be unnecessarily interfered with. The FGC of Norway intentional acts, such as crime, intelligence gathering, will be situated in the middle of Oslo’s city centre and terrorism and sabotage, and other unwanted incidents, will have a very large impact on the whole area. Some such as fire, water damage, and loss of electricity or might therefore argue that the FGC should preferably power. In addition, the study formulated seven absolute reinforce, rather than avoid interfering with, other soci- security requirements that indicate some risks its authors etal values, such as accessibility, openness and environ- considered important (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013, mental considerations. p. 75) [authors’ translation]: After the concept study was released in June 2013, a big debate arose regarding preservation of some of the 1. That there be a minimum of 20 meters from general older government buildings. The Directorate of Cultural vehicle traffic to government buildings, a distance Heritage, therefore, did their own study (with a mandate requirement that must be increased to 40 meters for from the Ministry of Environment) of the preservation those parts of the government complex containing value of these government buildings. It concluded that national functions that are either especially critical two of the buildings the concept study recommended and/or under heightened threat (infrastructure). for demolition were of very high preservation value (The 2. That the construction of buildings be undertaken in Directorate of Cultural Heritage 2013). The debate and line with specific principles. the sudden ordering of the new study demonstrate that, 3. That there be resistance to attacks using improvised even if not mentioned in the mandates, preservation also charges whether transported or carried. is a societal value that the FGC should not unnecessarily 4. That there be no physical contact between interfere with. government buildings (controlled area) and private Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 6 of 15 buildings (uncontrolled area). If the distance is adaptation is to use structural redundancy to protect the absent or less than 5 meters, appropriate safeguards complex and its inhabitants in case of a bomb attack. must be implemented. Standoff (which is the focus of the rest of the paper) is 5. That the possibility of shooting be minimised by another example of a security adaptation that protects limiting the view into the buildings. against all vehicle-borne threats. 6. That there be individual safeguarded pathways for critical infrastructure and separate transport Mechanism routes for trade and logistics staff. The causal mechanisms describe how the design 7. That the facades be surveillable. intervention works by interrupting, diverting or weak- ening a security threat (Ekblom 2012). The design of The first three absolute security requirements deal the FGC will contain a vast number of causal mecha- mainly with explosive attacks. Security requirement num- nisms for intervention against security threats. This ber 1 (standoff) has been imposed to counter a vehicle- study is, as mentioned previously, limited to VBIED borne threat, probably primarily to counter a VBIED attacks. threat, such as the case of the Breivik bombing of the old One way of indicating causal mechanisms in relation government complex, but it could also help impede other to offender purposes is to identify crime scripts. A crime vehicle-borne attacks (e.g. using a vehicle as a ram). Secur- script is a description of the procedural sequence a criminal ity requirement number 2 has been imposed such that the goes through when committing a specific type of crime. buildings should be able to withstand large explosions. By spelling out the actions (and their goals) necessary Security requirement number 3 has been imposed to to complete the crime, the crime script can ‘enhance counter smaller explosions that might also occur inside situational crime prevention policies by drawing atten- buildings. tion to a fuller range of possible intervention points’ The next three absolute requirements deal with more (Cornish 1994, p. 159-160). Meyer (2011) developed diverse threats. Security requirement number 4 counters crime scripts for an offender crashing a VBIED into a hostile intelligence and other intrusions. Security require- railway sites. The first crime script describes an offender ment number 5 counters assassinations, as well as hostile parking a VBIED (Meyer 2011, p. 314-315): intelligence. Security requirement number 6 counters any misdeeds against critical infrastructure, whether for hostile 1. Find suitable spot for crashing vehicle into carriage intelligence gathering, contamination, or cutting of the without being spotted or challenged. infrastructure, and impedes smuggling of unwanted mate- 2. Remove any physical obstacles without being rials and unwanted intrusion. Security requirement num- spotted or challenged. ber 7 supports the detection of all illegitimate behaviour. 3. Arm device and await the right moment without The FGC is thus exposed to significant threats, threats being spotted or challenged. that it must be protected from. The FGC will therefore 4. Crash into site while detonating the explosives. be protected by separate security products and securing products. A security product’smain purpose is to Meyer (2013, p. 4-5) has formulated a more detailed protect the FGC (Ekblom 2012). Examples of security crime script of the offender parking a VBIED: products include bollards, fire alarms, and CCTV. A securing product is one that has a subsidiary (secondary) 1. Devise outline plan: purpose(protecting thesecurityof thegovernment i. Establish desired outcome (scale of death/ complex, that is, securing the government complex) in destruction/publicity); addition to whatever its principal purpose is (Ekblom ii. Establish likely target locations (Clarke and 2012). Landscaping might be considered a securing prod- Newman 2006) . uct, for example. 2. Perform reconnaissance without being detected: Using security and securing products to protect the i. of suitable area(s) for leaving a vehicle-borne government complex makes for a secured complex, pro- device (including parking restrictions, parking tected by external means. But incorporating security or enforcement, normal parking activity, physical securing products or incorporating deliberate security security, closed-circuit television, and any blast adaptations can make the government complex an in- enhancing factors). herently secure one (Ekblom 2012). For example, a ii. of transport route(s) into suitable area. blast-resistant window is a securing component with the iii. of escape route(s) from suitable area. principal purpose to admit light while protecting against 3. Decide upon the most appropriate modus operandi the weather, and the subsidiary purpose to protect (probably only two main options): against blast effects. An example of a deliberate security i. Time delay device (long or short); Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 7 of 15 ii. Command initiation (remote or co-terminus abandoning the attack entirely, attacking another target (co-terminus = suicide)). (target substitution), or choosing a different attack mode 4. Gather detailed information to support modus (Meyer 2013). A standoff would, for example, protect operandi: against vehicle-borne explosives, while not being able to i. from personal contact; prevent any attack with a person-borne explosive. ii. from printed materials (books, newspapers, etc.); The technicalities section below discusses the technical iii. from the Internet; requirements for such standoff. iv. from first principles. 5. Locate suitable base from which to launch attack: Technicalities i. one’s own property; Describing the technicalities is primarily a task for future ii. a friend’s property; planning, but already now it is possible to set some ‘per- iii. a rented property; formance standards’ for the standoff (or buffer zone) be- iv. a derelict/ownerless property. tween general vehicle traffic and the FGC. 6. Consider personal security: The required distance between the perimeter bound- i. Counter-surveillance; ary and the FGC depends on many variables. These in- ii. Cover story; clude the threat level, that is, how much explosive force iii. Physical protection. security experts estimate that the attacker will be able to 7. Obtain suitable explosive materials/precursors generate, the importance and the quality of the site without being hurt or detected (probably three which must be protected, the buildings’ resilience to main options): blasts, and what sort of consequences we deem accept- Either able in case of a VBIED attack. i. purchased, or In addition to the distance requirements, the perim- ii. stolen, or eter boundary must be able to withstand the maximum iii. homemade from purchased or stolen precursors. speed a vehicle can reach at the perimeter. The maximum 8. Obtain information about how to assemble a device: speed depends on the surrounding areas. How is the road i. Purchase or steal necessary materials; system constructed? Can a vehicle use the roads to ac- ii. Purchase or steal necessary tools; celerate straight towards the boundary or will the road iii. Assemble device. system force the vehicle to slow down? Speed reduction 9. Obtain vehicle and other tools for transport and measures around the buffer zone, such as bumps and containment of explosive device without being curved roads, can therefore reduce the maximum force detected. the perimeter boundary must withstand. 10. Transport vehicle to target without being spotted The width between obstacles must, furthermore, not or challenged or explosives being detonated by be greater than 1.26 meters (Forman et al. 2009). If some accident. vehicles are to have access to the buffer zone, access 11. Find suitable spot for the explosive(s) and control is necessary. Electronic keys are a relatively easy (if necessary) for nearby viewing point for and inexpensive way to manage such access control, but detonation - without being spotted or challenged. unmanned gates are vulnerable to tailgating (sneaking a 12. Remove any physical obstacles at detonation site car in behind a legitimate user) and keys may go astray without being spotted or challenged. and are susceptible to hacking. For this reason, a guarded 13. Arm device and leave vehicle without being spotted gate is probably more secure. However, such a gate must or challenged. have protection that can withstand an accelerating vehicle, 14. Leave area or go to viewing point. and turning space for vehicles denied access (a rejection 15. Detonate device if command initiated (e.g. radio or line). The guards must also be protected to minimize the telephone controlled) without being spotted or possibility that they will be threatened or forced to open getting injured from explosion. the gate. Both above crime scripts highlight the need for finding a suitable site. A standoff that creates distance between Troublesome trade-offs an accessible spot and the target decreases the effect The above section shows why the FGC of Norway needs from the explosion upon the intended target and thus a standoff (buffer zone) between the government com- reduces the benefit of attacking. Crime participants seek, plex and general vehicle traffic. This measure has, how- however, to overcome the defences of their adversaries ever, more consequences than intended by the measure (Felson 2006). Instead of just accepting the reduced bene- and we refer to these consequences as externalities. This fit of attacking, the attacker might thus adapt; whether section accounts for these externalities and compares Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 8 of 15 them with the other purposes of the FGC to uncover required distance increases to 40 meters. A distance any ‘troublesome trade-offs’. requirement which distinguishes between two levels of security, where the ‘strict’ requirement of 40 meters will be Principal purpose employed for only a small part of the government complex, The principal purpose of the FGC is to provide long- makes for a relatively flexible government complex, where term, functional premises for the majority of the minis- most of the ministry function can be rearranged and/or tries, that is, the FGC must provide necessary space for moved within the complex. In other countries, the distance functioning ministries. The area available for building requirement varies more. For example, in Berlin, the au- the FGC is limited in extent. The quality assurance re- thorities distinguish between three threat levels for govern- port of the concept study demonstrated that if the FGC ment buildings. Only the three buildings with threat level 1 is to accommodate all the ministries for more than 50 (Bundestag, Bundeskanzleramt, and Bundesministerium years, the area must be densely developed (Berntsen et al. des Innern) have a required distance of a minimum of 50 2014). Using space for buffer zones leaves less space for meters to general vehicle traffic, and no streets have been development and makes it even more necessary to build closed off to general vehicle traffic outside other govern- denser and taller buildings in the remaining area, and can ment buildings (Metier, OPAK, LPO 2013). Differentiation make the FGC a less long-term solution. between government buildings lets the city keep more For a fully functional government complex, all legitim- streets open, but also makes the use of the government ate users, such as employees and visitors, need reason- buildings less flexible in case of changes in the ministry ably easy access. Introducing a buffer zone will make it structure. A possible solution to this dilemma is to install more difficult, if not impossible, for many users to access flexible barriers that close off streets only when govern- the FGC by car . Figures 2 and 3 displays two suggested ment functions that need the protection are located close government complexes where the government buildings to streets with general vehicle traffic. are marked in red and dashed lines mark the streets which the concept study recommends should be closed Security purpose off for general vehicle traffic. Figure 2 shows a reused A standoff between the FGC and general vehicle traffic version of the old government complex, while Figure 3 is a security measure aimed at vehicle-borne attacks. shows the current plans for the future government com- Such attacks are relatively rare in the Western world, plex (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). However, but the consequences can be significant should they suc- given the environmental policy objective to reduce ve- ceed. On a daily basis, other hazards, such as accidents hicle traffic in the city centre, such an obstacle might be and ordinary criminal incidents, can be more acute. positive. If legitimate users end up choosing to travel by In case of a life-threatening incident, emergency vehi- public transport, to walk, or to cycle, such a buffer zone cles need quick access to the area. A buffer zone might will contribute to fewer carbon emissions. Such an exter- delay such quick access. Good procedures to alert the nality might thus be called a positive externality. guards so they can be prepared to open the gates might Some legitimate users may have disabilities that make decrease such delays. Some incidents may also involve them dependent on motorized vehicles. To ensure that blocked gates (for example caused by collapsed build- they also have access, both the outdoor areas and close- ings). To ensure emergency-vehicle access in such inci- by public transport must be inclusively designed. dents, the buffer zone must have multiple access points. A fully functional government complex requires deliv- In case of fire, the fire department must have access eries. An external commodity reception where all items for all their cars to all major ‘fire attack paths’ (often the are inspected before they are forwarded to the govern- main entrance and stairways), with a maximum distance ment complex in security-cleared vehicles may ensure of 50 meters. In addition, the ground must be able to that deliveries do not compromise the buffer zone. This withstand the load of heavy fire engines and associated solution may also be both cost effective and environmen- supporting jacks. tally friendly. The FGC will have visitors that need extra security. For such visitors, waiting for access at the external per- Subsidiary purposes imeter may cause heightened risk of personal attacks. A Flexibility purpose gate to admit visitors with extra security needs must The concept study for the FGC formulated, as men- therefore be constructed to prevent personal attacks. tioned, the requirement that all government buildings should be situated a minimum of 20 meters from gen- Desire requirements eral vehicle traffic. For those parts of the government Representativeness complex containing national functions that are either The prime minister and other ministers regularly receive especially critical and/or under a heightened threat, the visitors from home and abroad and it is important for Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 9 of 15 Figure 2 The reused version of the Norwegian government complex with streets closed for general vehicle traffic (dashed lines) (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 10 of 15 Figure 3 The planned Norwegian government complex with streets closed for general vehicle traffic (dashed lines) (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 11 of 15 both the government and the rest of the state apparatus complex to be too long, compensatory measures must that the Norwegian government emerge with a culturally be implemented. representative government complex. This requirement Commerce depends on deliveries. If a buffer zone of representativeness applies to both inside areas and interferes with deliveries to neighbourhood commercial outside areas. How will the removal of almost all motor- businesses, alternative routes must be established. Some ized vehicles influence the representativeness of the out- commodities may also be transported without using a side areas? motorized vehicle. Streets with general vehicle traffic dominate outdoor Public transport, both underground and surface trans- areas in the city centre. However, motorized vehicles are port, is an essential part of a vibrant city centre. Some banned in some areas, such as pedestrian streets and public transport modes are underground, such as the park areas, thus providing greater design freedom for regular railway and the Oslo Metro, while others require those planning and designing the outdoor areas, and space on the surface and, thus, might be impeded by a creating opportunities for spaces that are more visually buffer zone. In Oslo city centre, both tram and bus lines pleasing. Consequently, a buffer zone that excludes mo- require surface space, and while current tram lines by- torized vehicles will probably increase the representa- pass the area designated for the FGC, conflict over a bus tiveness of outdoor areas. route which originally passed through the government A buffer zone around the government complex must, complex has already arisen. Even one bus route through as mentioned, be protected by barriers along the perim- a buffer zone creates specific security challenges: a bus is eter. Such barriers can be ugly, such as blocks of con- easy to obtain on the open market and could be turned crete, or pretty, such as reinforced planters. To ensure into a giant bomb disguised as a regular vehicle. In ad- the representativeness of the government complex, these dition, public transport depends on predictable condi- barriers should be designed to increase the attractiveness tions, and would suffer if heightened readiness were to of the outdoor areas rather than being ugly obstacles in cause disruptions in the regular schedule. the urban landscape. Removing motorized vehicles frees space, providing more space for other road users, such as pedestrians and Cost cyclists. Motorized vehicles might also limit vulnerable A buffer zone will, all things being equal, increase the road users’ mobility by being a ‘threat’ to them. Thus, by size of the FGC and thus increase its construction costs. reducing accessibility for motorized vehicles, such a buf- However, a buffer zone will reduce other security costs fer zone, might increase accessibility for pedestrians and related to protecting against VBIED attacks. For example, cyclists. a large standoff will reduce the required structural redun- dancy in buildings and thus reduce investment cost. Lack Environmental considerations of a standoff would also force security to continuously Removing vehicles will, as mentioned, have positive monitor all areas with vehicle access close to the FGC and environmental effects by encouraging a shift to more thus significantly increase security-related running costs. environmentally friendly transport. In addition, the buffer zone can be planted and thus provide green spaces for the ‘Hygiene’ or social-responsibility requirements densely built city centre. Even if social-responsibility requirements are mentioned last on the SFF’s list of purposes, the location of the FGC Preservation in a densely built city-centre area, affecting a vast number The Ministry of Environment emphasizes that cultural of neighbours and travellers, makes social-responsibility heritage is an important resource that must be protected requirements very salient. Different stakeholders, such and expanded even while cities are transforming. In as different governmental authorities, also disagree about other words, the conservation value of older structures which requirements are more important. must be considered when redeveloping the city. A chal- lenge with using older buildings for government pur- Accessibility poses is that they often are less space efficient than A buffer zone that excludes general vehicle traffic will newer purpose-built structures. Keeping old structures obviously impede ordinary motorists travelling into or will therefore have to be compensated for by increasing through the government complex. However, given the the outdoor space needed to build the FGC (Berntsen environmental policy objectives to reduce car traffic in et al. 2014). the city centre, reduced motorized traffic can also be positive. Some vehicle-access issues are, however, more External security needs salient than others. If a buffer zone causes emergency- For common citizens either travelling through the FGC service response times to neighbours of the government or just spending time in outside areas, other risks might Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 12 of 15 be more salient than the risk of a vehicle-borne attack maintenance should therefore not be neglected in the buf- against the government complex. For example, the risk fer zone. of robbery and/or rape might make citizens choose against using outside areas at night. Jane Jacobs’ concept Vibrant city centre of eyes on the street claims that movement through an To ensure that the area around the FGC is vibrant and area will create natural surveillance (Jacobs 1961), and that people choose to use the area, it is important that since criminals do not generally wish to be observed or both regular users and visitors perceive the area as at- apprehended, such surveillance can prevent crime. Intel- tractive, regardless of gender, age, income, or education. ligently designed landscape and lighting can promote Offering a variety of entertainment motivates people to natural surveillance from the interior of a building and spend time in public spaces. Removing general vehicle from the exterior by neighbours and passers-by (Cozens traffic might banish activities that rely on frequent deliv- 2002). Car occupants, cyclists, and pedestrians can func- eries. However, the buffer zone can also be used to pro- tion as eyes on the street, and if reduced driving through vide an attractive recreation area, such as a park with a the area is compensated for by increased cycling and skate ramp. In addition, buildings on the FGC’s fringe, walking, natural surveillance need not be diminished. It such as the old Oslo Public Library, can be redeveloped is, furthermore, likely that slow road users in the open as attractions for the greater population. A challenge here have a greater preventive effect than do passengers trav- would be to introduce attractions that do not sacrifice elling fast inside a vehicle. other security requirements, such as protection from in- The FGC will, as mentioned, face a wide range of risks. telligence gathering, for example, hostile reconnaissance The Government Administration Services will therefore using binoculars from high buildings. employ CCTV surveillance in their effort to handle these different risks. This monitoring capacity can also be Summary employed to detect crimes against citizens, such as rapes Table 2 summarizes both the challenges and the oppor- and robberies. If security personnel interrupt detected tunities connected with introducing a buffer zone with crimes and/or the information is used in subsequent reduced accessibility for motorized vehicles. investigation and prosecution, such CCTV can serve to increase the overall security of the protected area and to Discussion provide more security for general citizens using outdoor This paper has extended the use of the SFF from rela- areas. Use of this measure is likely to more than com- tively straightforward products, such as the Grippa Clip pensate for any reduced security caused by excluding and a railway carriage, to the many-faceted FGC. In vehicles. Meyer and Ekblom (2012), the authors assessed the Having fewer cars in the buffer zone will initially re- framework by discussing whether it (1) was clearly ex- duce encounters between vulnerable road users (pedes- pressed, (2) facilitated creativity, and (3) was practically trians and cyclists) and motorized vehicles. Fewer such applicable. After employing the framework in the FGC of encounters will also, other things being equal, lead to Norway, this paper’s authors would like to comment on fewer road accidents between vehicles and pedestrians. those three criteria. If vulnerable road users are unwary of motorized vehi- Our experience is that the SFF terms were relatively cles (risk compensation), the advantageous effect (a re- easy to employ when describing the FGC’s security func- duction in road accidents) of fewer cars is reduced. Such tion. It was not evident that a framework developed for risk compensation will, however, probably not entirely straightforward products would also work for such a eliminate the beneficial effect of decreasing the number many-faceted development, but we had no problems when of motorized vehicles. An increase of vulnerable road describing the security function. This study has thus rein- users in the area, however, can increase conflicts between forced the claim that the SFF is clearly expressed. cyclists and pedestrians, which might in turn cause more Meyer and Ekblom (2012) concluded, after a short dis- accidents between such road users. Fortunately, traffic ac- cussion, that the SFF facilitated structured creativity. In cidents involving only such users usually result in injuries the current case, the authors identified many of the con- of a less serious nature; therefore, an increase in such acci- crete challenges and opportunities before they employed dents will unlikely be large enough to remove the positive the SFF, partly since the framework was employed so impact on road safety of reducing the number of cars. late in the investigation. However, the framework forced Winter maintenance should not be neglected just the authors to rethink, and to connect the purposes because motorized traffic is reduced. For example, if foot- of the FGC to the challenges and opportunities, and paths are slippery, accidents might rise given possibly thereby made the underlying conflicting principles increased pedestrian and cycle traffic due to reduced mo- more evident. The SFF is therefore fertile in the sense that torized traffic. For the sake of remaining users, winter it structures the argument and clarifies the contact points Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 13 of 15 Table 2 Outline of challenges and opportunities/solutions Requirements Challenges Opportunities/solutions Primary purpose Space Less space for buildings Building denser Constructing taller buildings Functional Deliveries External commodity reception Reduced accessibility for disabled people Constructing areas that improve inclusive access Subsidiary purposes Flexibility Variable distance requirements Flexible barriers Internal security Emergency vehicle access Multiple access points Secure access for important visitors Protected access points Desire requirements Representative Ugly barriers Constructing barriers that increase the attractiveness of outdoor areas Social-responsibility requirements Accessibility General vehicle access Better pedestrian and bicycle access Deliveries Alternative routes and/or transport by non-motorized vehicles Public surface transport Increase underground transport Environmental concerns More environmentally friendly transport Green outdoor areas Preservation Less space-efficient use of land External security Fewer eyes on the street Employing formal surveillance to make other citizens feel safer Better road safety for the remaining road users Vibrant city centre Deliveries for attractions Using the buffer zone to create attractions between the different purposes, as well as offering a sys- SFF in the FGC of Norway will help illuminate these tematic approach to gather and systemize the relevant ‘troublesome trade-offs’. information. The analysis has demonstrated that standoff creates The FGC is a project that by all appearances will be challenges for other purposes of the FGC, such as func- realised, and the ideas formulated in this paper could tional office spaces for all employees, but many of these therefore be further tested during the development and challenges can be solved by planning intelligently, such as the building of the FGC. A brief look at Table 2 also creating an external commodity reception. Standoff also shows that all of the suggested solutions are possible to creates opportunities for reinforcing social-responsibility realise and could be implemented, given a positive polit- requirements, such as accessibility for pedestrians and ical climate. However, one of the main reasons for the environmental considerations. The current literature has solutions’ feasibility is that they seek to implement stake- mostly focused on negative externalities of security, while holders’ expressed wishes as revealed during the authors’ this paper demonstrates that security measures can have comprehensive information collection amongst the stake- both negative and positive externalities and that planning holders. The SFF can therefore aid in clear thinking and might alleviate some of the negative ones. The results, fur- structured creativity, but it cannot compensate for com- thermore, support Little’s (2004) notion about thinking prehensive information collection among different stake- holistically about protection to create robust and effective holders to ascertain their various perspectives by way of security, and show that the academic community can as- developing solutions that meet their requirements as sist in such holistic thinking. much as possible. The discussion showed that the SFF is expressed in terms that also can be employed in the multifaceted Conclusion FGC of Norway. The framework, furthermore, forced The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it explores the authors to rethink and connect the purposes of the various trade-offs between standoff and other values, FGC to the challenges and opportunities and made the and, when appropriate, proposes possible solutions to underlying conflicting principles more evident. The solu- such dilemmas. Second, it asks whether employing the tions proposed through this process were also practically Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 14 of 15 applicable, but one of the main reasons for the solutions’ Stavanger, Norway. Department of Economics and Logisticst, Institute of Transport Economics, Gaustadalleen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway. feasibility was probably the comprehensive information collection prior to employing the framework. Received: 3 September 2014 Accepted: 13 March 2015 This paper focuses on one measure, standoff, and explores the trade-offs between employing standoff and other purposes/values. All the dilemmas mentioned are therefore References Armitage R, Monchuk L (2009). Reconciling Security with Sustainability: The two-dimensional. Such dilemmas might, however, have even Challenge for Eco-Homes. Built Environment, 35(3):308–327. more than two dimensions. For example, Berntsen et al. Berntsen S, Sunde T, Rosseland KM, Johansen KW, Meyer SF, Jore SH, Aven T, (2014) have shown that some trade-offs have three dimen- Bratseth I, Finsveen J, Lolleng J, Steenberg G (2014) Fremtidig regjeringskvartal - Kvalitetssikring av beslutningsunderlag for konseptvalg sions, such as, for the FGC of Norway, the trade-off between (KS1). Dovre Group and TOI, Oslo enough office space, standoff, and preservation. Such City of Oslo (2014) Økt byliv i Oslo sentrum. Oslo municipality. http://www. trade-offs should be explored further, including the prosjekt-levende.oslo.kommune.no/article275243-20413.html. Accessed 2 May 2014 three-dimensional trade-off between functional office Clarke RV, Newman GR (2006) Outsmarting the Terrorists. Praeger Security space, environmental requirements and security measures. International, Westport Another direction for future research would be to apply Coaffee J, O’Hare P, Hawkesworth M (2009) The visibility of (in)security: the aesthetics of planning urban defences against terrorism. Secur Dialogue the SFF to protecting even more complex ‘products’. 40(4–5):489–511, doi:10.1177/0967010609343299 Could we extend this framework to protecting other areas, Cormie D, Mays G, Smith P (2009) Blast Effects on Buildings, 2nd edn. Thomas such as a park, a neighbourhood, or even a city centre? Telford Publishing, London Cornish DB (1994) The Procedural Analysis of Offending and its Relevance for Situational Prevention. In: Clarke RV (ed) Crime Prevention Studies. Criminal Endnotes Justice Press, New York, pp 151–196 Cozens PM (2002) Sustainable Urban Development and Crime Prevention Another relevant case is Oklahoma City, the capital Through Environmental Design for the British City. Towards an Effective of the U.S. state Oklahoma. Urban Environmentalism for the 21st Century. Cities 19 (2):129–137. http://dx. The map is owned by the City of Oslo, Agency for doi.org/10.1016/S0264-2751(02)00008-2 Ekblom P (2005) Designing Products against Crime. In: Tilley N (ed) Handbook of Planning and Building Services, and has been down- Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Willan, Cullompton, pp 203–244 loaded from http://www.planinnsyn.oslo.no/. Ekblom P (2012) The Security Function Framework. In: Ekblom P (ed) Design In this discussion the FGC is treated as a unit situated Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Product, vol 27. Lynne Reiner, Boulder, Col, pp 9–36 in the habitat of the wider environment of Oslo City and Ekblom P, Bowers K, Gamman L, Sidebottom A, Thomas C, Thorpe A, Willcocks M occupies particular security niches. One could also treat (2012) Reducing Handbag Theft. In: Ekblom P (ed) Design Against Crime: the FGC as a habitat within which smaller-scale entities, Crime Proofing Everyday Objects, vol 27. Crime Prevention Studies. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Col, pp 167–200 for example, specific buildings, have particular security Ettouney M, Smilowitz R, Rittenhouse T (1996) Blast resistant design of functions and occupy niches within the complex. commercial buildings. Pract Period Struct Des Construct 1(1):31–39, EVIL DONE summarizes the main properties of the doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1084-0680(1996)1:1(31) Felson M (2006) Crime and Nature. Sage publications, Thousand Oaks targets that terrorists choose: Exposed, Vital, Iconic, Le- Forman P, Evans D, Heward G (2009) Chapter 11 – Vehicle-Borne Threats and the gitimate, Destructible, Occupied, Near and Easy (Clarke Principles of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation. In: Cormie D, Mays G, Smith P (eds) and Newman, 2006). Blast Effects on Buildings. Thomas Telford Limited, London Gamman L, Thorpe A (2007) Liberty Versus Safety: A Design Review. University of Such standoff arrangements can be (and have been) Arts, London compromised if important persons expect to be taken Gebbeken N, Döge T, Larcher M (2012) Safety and Security of Urban Areas right up to the door in their vehicles and the managers through Innovative Architectural and Structural Concepts. In: Aschenbruck N, Martini P, Meier M, Tölle J (eds) Future Security, vol 318. Communications in of the complex fail to resist their demands. Computer and Information Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg:153–164. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33161-9_22 Competing interests Gemzøe L (2006) Quality for People, a set of Quality Criteria for the Design of Part of this study has been funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Local Pedestrian Places and Networks: With People in Mind. Paper presented at Government and Modernisation. the “Next Steps”, the 7th International Conference on Walking and Livable Communities, Melbourne, Australia Authors’ contributions Jacobs J (1961) The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Vintage Books, Sunniva Meyer participated in the acquisition of data, employed the Security New York Function Framework on the case and drafted the manuscript. Sissel H. Jore Khajehpour S, Grierson DE (2003) Profitability versus safety of high-rise office buildings. and Kjell W. Johansen participated in the acquisition of data and helped Struct Multidisc Optim 25(4):279–293, doi:10.1007/s00158-003-0297-4 draft the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Leech BL (2002) Asking questions: techniques for semistructured interviews. Pol Sci Pol 35(04):665–668, doi:10.1017/S1049096502001129 Acknowledgment Lemanski C (2004) A new apartheid? the spatial implications of fear of We have received valuable comments and advice from Paul Ekblom. We crime in cape town, south africa. Environ Urbanization 16(2):101–112, would also like to thank Fran Azevedo for excellent copy editing services. doi:10.1177/095624780401600201 Little R (2004) Holistic Strategy for Urban Security. Journal of Infrastructure Author details Systems 10 (2):52–59. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1076-0342(2004)10:2(52) Department of Safety, Security and the Environment, Institute of Transport Loukaitou-Sideris A (2006) Is it safe to walk?1 neighborhood safety and security Economics, Gaustadalleen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway. SEROS – Centre for considerations and their effects on walking. J Plann Lit 20(3):219–232, Risk Management and Societal Safety, University of Stavanger, N-4036 doi:10.1177/0885412205282770 Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 15 of 15 Metier, OPAK, LPO (2013) RKV KVU B07 Referansestudier. Metier, Oslo Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter (2013) Konseptvalgutredning for Fremtidig Regjeringskvartal. Metier, Oslo Meyer S (2011) Reducing harm from explosive attacks against railways. Secur J 25(4):309–325 Meyer S (2013) Impeding lone-wolf attacks: lessons derived from the 2011 Norway attacks. Crime Sci 2(1):7 Meyer S, Ekblom P (2012) Specifying the explosion-resistant railway carriage—a ‘bench’ test of the security function framework. J Transport Saf Secur 5:69–85, doi:10.1007/s12198-011-0082-3 Ministry of Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs (2012) Mandate for Concept Study of Future Government Building Complex. Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, Oslo Ministry of Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs (2013) Mandate for External Quality Assurance of the Concept Study for Future Government Complex. Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, Oslo Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation (2013) Rebuilding the government building complex. Department for Central Government Buildings, Security and Administrative Services http://www.regjeringen.no/ en/dep/kmd/subjects/Housing-and-building-policy/the-government-building- complex/rebuilding-the-government-building-compl.html?id=712726. Accessed 7 March 2014 Minken H, Larsen OI, Braute JH, Berntsen S, Sunde T (2009) Konseptvalgutredninger og Samfunnsøkonomiske Analyser. Transportøkonomisk institutt, Oslo Oslo City Council (2013) Byrådets Forslag til Budsjett 2014 og Økonomiplan 2014–2017. Oslo City Council, Oslo Sætnan AR, Lomell HM, Wiecek C (2002) Controlling CCTV in public spaces: is privacy the (only) issue? reflections on Norwegian and Danish observations. Surveill Soc 2:2/3 The Directorate of Cultural Heritage (2013) The government complex. The Directorate of Cultural Heritage’s study on preservation value and new uses. The Directorate of Cultural Heritage, Oslo The Public Prosecutors (2012) Indictment. Oslo Public Prosecutors, Oslo Thorpe A, Johnson SD, Sidebottom A (2012) Designing Against Bicycle Theft. In: Ekblom P (ed) Design Against Crime : Crime Proofing Everyday Products, vol 27. Crime Prevention Studies, 27th edn. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Co, pp 107–130 Zedner L (2003) Too much security? International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31 (3):155–184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsl.2003.09.002 Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from: 7 Convenient online submission 7 Rigorous peer review 7 Immediate publication on acceptance 7 Open access: articles freely available online 7 High visibility within the fi eld 7 Retaining the copyright to your article Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png City, Territory and Architecture Springer Journals

Troublesome trade-offs: balancing urban activities and values when securing a city-centre governmental quarter

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Springer Journals
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Copyright © 2015 by Meyer et al.; licensee Springer.
Subject
Geography; Landscape/Regional and Urban Planning; Urban Ecology; Landscape Ecology
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2195-2701
DOI
10.1186/s40410-015-0025-6
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Abstract

Background: Homeland security measures increasingly affect urban life and activities. Standoff distance, which prevents unscreened vehicles from approaching within a certain distance of a building, is a widely applied measure when protecting buildings against attacks with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. This measure both is rather inexpensive and has few negative externalities when implemented in rural areas. Unfortunately, sites with protection needs often are situated in city centres. Methods: We apply the so-called Security Function Framework to illuminate the externalities or the ‘troublesome trade-offs’ between protecting a high-value site against vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and protecting other urban values. Results: This paper demonstrates that standoff creates challenges for other important values, such as functional office spaces for all employees, deliveries and emergency vehicle access. Simultaneously, standoff creates opportunities for reinforcing social-responsibility requirements, such as accessibility for pedestrians and environmental considerations. Conclusions: Security measures can have both negative and positive externalities and planning might alleviate some of the negative ones. Keywords: External effects; Design conflicts; Contradictions; Security; Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices; Standoff distance measures; City centres; Holistic security Background improvised explosive devices (VBIED) has increased dras- On 22 July 2011 at 3:17 pm Anders Behring Breivik left tically, both when protecting the current buildings and a vehicle-borne explosive device in the government com- when planning the future government complex (FGC). plex of Norway. The bomb detonated at 3:25 pm, killing Current practice for protecting buildings against such eight people and destroying three government buildings attacks is to combine measures that strengthen the build- (The Public Prosecutors 2012). A reduced presence of ing and its facade with a standoff around the building government employees (it was late Friday afternoon and (Ettouney et al. 1996). Since the effect of a bomb decreases the holiday season), together with the fact that no building exponentially with distance from the bomb, a standoff collapsed, limited causalities. The amount of damage did, that creates distance between a potential explosive and a however, induce the government to examine the possi- building is a very effective measure (Cormie et al. 2009; bility of redeveloping the government complex to enable Gebbeken et al. 2012). the majority of the ministries to move into it in future Creating standoff in rural areas where land is cheap (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2013). and available is relatively inexpensive and easy. Unfortu- Following the bomb attack on the government complex, nately, many buildings with protection needs are situated the focus on measures that protect against vehicle-borne in city centres where land is expensive and annexation of land can have major disadvantages for the building’susers, * Correspondence: [email protected] 1 its neighbours, and other members of the public. The pur- Department of Safety, Security and the Environment, Institute of Transport pose of this paper is to identify and explain the various Economics, Gaustadalleen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway Full list of author information is available at the end of the article © 2015 Meyer et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 2 of 15 trade-offs between standoff and other values, and, where address the risk of terrorism (Gamman and Thorpe 2007). appropriate, to propose possible solutions to such di- Armitage and Monchuk (2009) explore conflicts and syn- lemmas. We do all three by employing the ‘The Security ergies between security and sustainability of housing. To Function Framework’ (SFF), as formulated in Ekblom facilitate robust and effective security which does not (2012), in the case of the FGC of Norway. The FGC of incur unnecessary costs, Little (2004) calls for holistic Norway is an example of a multifaceted project that security where interactions between government officials, requires protective security while being situated in a city security professionals, program and financial staff, and centre where land is scarce. emergency responders occur regularly, rather than on a Ekblom (2005) introduces the term ‘troublesome trade- project-by-project basis. Better planning before construct- offs’ when describing the potentially conflicting re- ing buildings with protection needs would also enable us quirements which must be considered by the designer. to solve many troublesome trade-offs. Conflicting requirements include values such as aesthet- Ekblom and colleagues have developed a four-level ics, legal and ethical issues, environmental considerations, framework, the SFF, for describing a product’s ‘security safety, convenience, cost, and social inclusion (Ekblom function’. This framework was constructed with the 2005, 2012). The pursuit of security involves handling purpose of describing both the rationale that underlies a many such troublesome trade-offs, including that security crime-resistant design and the immediate output of the may suspend normal democratic freedom in zones of high ‘design-against-crime’ process (Ekblom 2012). The SFF security and that security dictates that we should distrust can be briefly summarized (Ekblom et al. 2012; Ekblom others (Zedner 2003). CCTV, for example, can encourage 2012): social inclusion by increasing perceived safety (Loukaitou- Sideris 2006), while also facilitating discriminatory prac- – Purpose – what the designed product is for, tices and can thus cause social exclusion (Sætnan et al. including both security and other requirements. 2002). Security may even replace public spaces with – Niche – how the security function of a given private spaces, such as the case of gated communities. product relates to other security arrangements. Paradoxically, such private security may reduce public – Mechanism – how the product’s security function order by removing the responsibility of the inhabitants for works in terms of cause and effect. the “outside” (Lemanski 2004). – Technicality – how the product is constructed and Gebbeken et al. 2012 argue that since a free demo- manufactured and how it operates. cratic society will never accept a surveillance state, we need passive security measures, such as innovative and Ekblom (2012) distinguishes between different pur- architecturally attractive buildings and landscape ele- poses: (1) the principal purpose, which may or may not ments. Such measures, however, also entail troublesome be one of security, (2) subsidiary purposes, (3) desire trade-offs. Khajehpour and Grierson (2003) demonstrate requirements that are beneficial to the immediate that high-rise office buildings ‘designs with the most users and manufacturers, and (4) ‘hygiene’ or social- profit potential and those with the most safety potential responsibility requirements, referring to other societal correspond to buildings that also are the least safe and the values which the product should not interfere with. least profitable, respectively’ (Khajehpour and Grierson Work within the Design against Crime Research Centre 2003). Coaffee et al. (2009) discuss the visual impact of has contributed to this framework and two projects were counter-terrorism security measures. Visible security fea- especially relevant: The Bikeoff project, whereby parking tures ‘tell’ the public that a place can be used safely, while stands and other facilities were developed to be secure potential offenders ‘are ‘told’ that their malign intent is against bike theft (Thorpe et al. 2012), and the Grippa likely to be in vain or at least will require a significant Clip, which addressed preventing theft of customers’ bags degree of effort’ (Coaffee et al. 2009). Security features in bars through specially designed anchoring clips to fit on can, however, also increase fear by drawing attention to tables (Ekblom et al. 2012). Meyer and Ekblom (2012), the fact that security is necessary for protection (Zedner furthermore, did a desktop test of the SFF by using it to 2003; Coaffee et al. 2009; Lemanski 2004). specify design requirements of an explosion-resistant Gamman and Thorpe (2007) discusses trade-offs be- railway carriage. They concluded that the framework tween providing bicycle parking and terrorism preven- was clearly expressed, facilitated structured creativity, tion and argue that monitored long-term parking can and was seemingly quite practically applicable (Meyer and both reduce bicycle thefts and prevent bicycle bombs, Ekblom 2012). while providing short-term bicycle parking that does not The above studies use the SFF to spell out the design allow for bicycle bombs might be more challenging. of relatively contained products. The FGC of Norway is They do, however, argue that removing bags from a more complicated and multifaceted product. It will bikes (rather than bikes) should, in most cases, sufficiently contain government functions that are essential for the Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 3 of 15 governance of a country. The complex will also be situ- of the FGC, (2) the security niche of the FGC, (3) the ated in a dense city-centre area and its features will mechanism behind protecting against VBIED attacks, impinge on all the numerous neighbours and city-centre and (4) some technicalities of implementing standoff. visitors. The FGC will therefore have some impact on Section three also outlines the troublesome trade-offs many equally essential values. Hence, this study asks: between implementing standoff and achieving other pur- Can the SFF be successfully employed in the case of the poses of the FGC. Finally, section four assesses the per- FGC of Norway? And will the framework help illuminate formance of the SFF in analysing the FGC, and section the ‘troublesome trade-offs’ when constructing a new five concludes the paper. government complex? We reformulate the three assess- ment criteria employed in Meyer and Ekblom (2012): 1. Method The terms employed in the SFF should also be easily The case of the FGC of Norway is interesting because it is employed in the FGC (clearly expressed); 2. The SFF rare that a new government complex is planned in such a should support the users of the framework in exposing dense area of a city (see Figure 1). The government com- additional troublesome trade-offs (fertile); and 3. It plex in Berlin is the nearest example case the authors should help users to produce relevant solutions to the know of, but in that case the city had lots of free space troublesome trade-offs (practically applicable). owing to the removal of the Berlin Wall . The procedural The next section describes the information-collection requirements of a large public-procurement exercise in process used in the study discussed in this paper. Sec- Norway also make it easier to examine the motivations tion three employs the SFF in the FGC: (1) the purposes and the justifications behind all the choices for the FGC. Figure 1 The city centre of Oslo. The circle encompasses the area where the government complex will be situated . Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 4 of 15 The authors were involved in the quality assurance of Results the concept study for the FGC (Minken et al. 2009). The The security function of the FGC quality assurance was carried out autumn 2013 and win- This section presents the results of employing the SFF in ter 2014, and the quality assurance report was presented the FGC of Norway. The FGC involves a vast number of to the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform stakeholders, including everything from the city of Oslo and Church Affairs February 2014. As part of this to the small corner store in the neighbourhood, but this process, we interviewed relevant stakeholders on their paper lacks space to examine all stakeholders’ perspec- perspectives concerning the complex. The interviews tives. The discussion below, therefore, pays particular were all semi-structured (Leech 2002) and always con- attention to the Norwegian authorities’ perspective and ducted by at least two interviewers (for some interviews deals only with other stakeholders’ perspectives when even three or four interviewers). The interviewers took official government documents explicitly refer to their notes and these notes were compared after the inter- interests. views. All these interviews were confidential, so we can- not refer specifically to any particular one (or produce Purpose direct quotes) when we discuss the issues raised in According to the mandate for the concept study (Minis- the interviews. We have, however, included a list in the try of Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Table 1 of all the interviews that at least one of the authors Affairs 2012), a new government complex must be pre- participated in (Berntsen et al. 2014). pared to provide a long-term solution for [functional] In addition to the interviews, we conducted a docu- premises for the majority of the ministries. The mandate ment analysis of relevant policy documents, such as the for the quality assurance is more specific; it says that mandates for the concept study and the quality assur- ‘the majority of the ministries’ implies significantly more ance, the concept study, and other publicly available than half of the ministries (Ministry of Government sources (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013; Ministry of Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). Both Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs mandates specify that the ministries should be located in 2012, 2013). the area for many decades to come (Ministry of Govern- After finishing the quality assurance of the concept ment Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs 2012, study, we collected relevant academic literature and 2013). Since the FGC will be designed to provide func- employed the SFF on the information collected through tional premises for the ministries, this purpose can be the quality assurance process. referred to as the primary purpose of the FGC. Table 1 Interviews conducted as part of the quality assurance where at least one of this article's authors participated Date Topic(s) Organisation 26.09.13 Site survey, security Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs Statsbygg 27.09.13 Security Norwegian Police Security Service 01.10.13 Security Norwegian National Security Authority 02.10.13 Security National Police Directorate Norway 03.10.13 Security, costs Norwegian Defence Estates Agency 07.10.13 Accessibility for emergency vehicles Agency for Fire and Rescue Services, City of Oslo 08.10.13 Accessibility, public transport Ruter AS (common management company for public transport in Oslo and Akershus) 09.10.13 Space requirements, security Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation 10.10.13 Accessibility for emergency vehicles Ambulance and Paramedic Department, Oslo University Hospital 10.10.13 Security Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 18.10.13 Implementation strategy, costs, security Statsbygg 18.10.13 Planning process, accessibility, the urban environment Vice Mayor of Urban Development, City of Oslo Agency for Planning and Building Services, City of Oslo Agency for Urban Environment, City of Oslo 24.10.13 Special needs SMK Office of the Prime Minister 25.10.13 Security, emergency planning, costs Ministry of Justice and Public Security 30.10.13 Security, emergency planning Emergency Planning Agency, City of Oslo Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 5 of 15 The mandates, furthermore, stipulate that the premises The 2014 draft budget of Oslo City Council states that must satisfy necessary requirements for both flexibility Oslo City Council will be working towards providing and security. The premises must be flexible enough to safe and secure public spaces. The Council has therefore handle changes in both the ministerial structure and the established a safety index based on the police’s crime working methods, and must satisfy necessary security statistics and annual surveys of the population (Oslo requirements (Ministry of Government Adminstration, City Council 2013). Safety from both deliberate and acci- Reform and Church Affairs 2012, 2013). These purposes dental harm is, accordingly, another societal value the (about flexibility and security) are not what the FGC is FGC should reinforce or, at a minimum, avoid interfer- designed for, but they describe properties of the FGC that ing with. are so crucial that they can be referred to as subsidiary Vibrant Oslo (Levende Oslo) is a project whose aim is purposes. to increase the activity in the city centre (City of Oslo Interviews with relevant stakeholders have also uncov- 2014). Activity in public space depends on the presence ered some other requirements for the FGC: the FGC of some attractive characteristics, including accessibility, should be ‘representative’.By ‘representative’ they we aesthetics and safety (Gemzøe 2006). In addition, people mean that the FGC must favourably project Norway and use public space when they either are passing through the Norwegian government. The buildings should be well or have a destination situated in the area (e.g. street ven- designed, on the outside and inside, and should be mag- dors, entertainment centre or public transport). Most nificent without being too grand to represent Norwegian visitors to the area, whether on business or sightseeing, identity and culture. The ‘representative’ requirement is a will travel there because they are intending to visit the desire requirement, because it is not strictly necessary, but ministries. But to ensure activity outside office hours, nevertheless is a nice-to-have feature for the Norwegian the area will need after-hours attractions. Will a buffer government. zone paralyze all other activities in the area or could it Inherent in any concept study and quality assurance of help reinforce activity by offering other visitors some- large public projects are calculations of the investment thing to do? cost. This cost focus shows that minimizing expenses also is a desire requirement. Minimizing running costs, Security niche such as heating, maintenance, and surveillance, is prob- The security niche characterizes how the security func- ably also a desire requirement. tion relates to other security-related products, people The mandates also mention some requirements that and places (Ekblom 2012). But before describing a secur- refer to other societal values. These values include traffic ity niche of the FGC, a more thorough look at the risks flow and environmental requirements for the buildings the government complex faces is necessary. (Ministry of Government Adminstration, Reform and The government complex comprises functions, em- Church Affairs 2012, 2013). According to the SFF, ‘hy- ployees and material values, all of which need protection giene’ or social-responsibility requirements should not from a broad range of risks. The concept study mentions be unnecessarily interfered with. The FGC of Norway intentional acts, such as crime, intelligence gathering, will be situated in the middle of Oslo’s city centre and terrorism and sabotage, and other unwanted incidents, will have a very large impact on the whole area. Some such as fire, water damage, and loss of electricity or might therefore argue that the FGC should preferably power. In addition, the study formulated seven absolute reinforce, rather than avoid interfering with, other soci- security requirements that indicate some risks its authors etal values, such as accessibility, openness and environ- considered important (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013, mental considerations. p. 75) [authors’ translation]: After the concept study was released in June 2013, a big debate arose regarding preservation of some of the 1. That there be a minimum of 20 meters from general older government buildings. The Directorate of Cultural vehicle traffic to government buildings, a distance Heritage, therefore, did their own study (with a mandate requirement that must be increased to 40 meters for from the Ministry of Environment) of the preservation those parts of the government complex containing value of these government buildings. It concluded that national functions that are either especially critical two of the buildings the concept study recommended and/or under heightened threat (infrastructure). for demolition were of very high preservation value (The 2. That the construction of buildings be undertaken in Directorate of Cultural Heritage 2013). The debate and line with specific principles. the sudden ordering of the new study demonstrate that, 3. That there be resistance to attacks using improvised even if not mentioned in the mandates, preservation also charges whether transported or carried. is a societal value that the FGC should not unnecessarily 4. That there be no physical contact between interfere with. government buildings (controlled area) and private Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 6 of 15 buildings (uncontrolled area). If the distance is adaptation is to use structural redundancy to protect the absent or less than 5 meters, appropriate safeguards complex and its inhabitants in case of a bomb attack. must be implemented. Standoff (which is the focus of the rest of the paper) is 5. That the possibility of shooting be minimised by another example of a security adaptation that protects limiting the view into the buildings. against all vehicle-borne threats. 6. That there be individual safeguarded pathways for critical infrastructure and separate transport Mechanism routes for trade and logistics staff. The causal mechanisms describe how the design 7. That the facades be surveillable. intervention works by interrupting, diverting or weak- ening a security threat (Ekblom 2012). The design of The first three absolute security requirements deal the FGC will contain a vast number of causal mecha- mainly with explosive attacks. Security requirement num- nisms for intervention against security threats. This ber 1 (standoff) has been imposed to counter a vehicle- study is, as mentioned previously, limited to VBIED borne threat, probably primarily to counter a VBIED attacks. threat, such as the case of the Breivik bombing of the old One way of indicating causal mechanisms in relation government complex, but it could also help impede other to offender purposes is to identify crime scripts. A crime vehicle-borne attacks (e.g. using a vehicle as a ram). Secur- script is a description of the procedural sequence a criminal ity requirement number 2 has been imposed such that the goes through when committing a specific type of crime. buildings should be able to withstand large explosions. By spelling out the actions (and their goals) necessary Security requirement number 3 has been imposed to to complete the crime, the crime script can ‘enhance counter smaller explosions that might also occur inside situational crime prevention policies by drawing atten- buildings. tion to a fuller range of possible intervention points’ The next three absolute requirements deal with more (Cornish 1994, p. 159-160). Meyer (2011) developed diverse threats. Security requirement number 4 counters crime scripts for an offender crashing a VBIED into a hostile intelligence and other intrusions. Security require- railway sites. The first crime script describes an offender ment number 5 counters assassinations, as well as hostile parking a VBIED (Meyer 2011, p. 314-315): intelligence. Security requirement number 6 counters any misdeeds against critical infrastructure, whether for hostile 1. Find suitable spot for crashing vehicle into carriage intelligence gathering, contamination, or cutting of the without being spotted or challenged. infrastructure, and impedes smuggling of unwanted mate- 2. Remove any physical obstacles without being rials and unwanted intrusion. Security requirement num- spotted or challenged. ber 7 supports the detection of all illegitimate behaviour. 3. Arm device and await the right moment without The FGC is thus exposed to significant threats, threats being spotted or challenged. that it must be protected from. The FGC will therefore 4. Crash into site while detonating the explosives. be protected by separate security products and securing products. A security product’smain purpose is to Meyer (2013, p. 4-5) has formulated a more detailed protect the FGC (Ekblom 2012). Examples of security crime script of the offender parking a VBIED: products include bollards, fire alarms, and CCTV. A securing product is one that has a subsidiary (secondary) 1. Devise outline plan: purpose(protecting thesecurityof thegovernment i. Establish desired outcome (scale of death/ complex, that is, securing the government complex) in destruction/publicity); addition to whatever its principal purpose is (Ekblom ii. Establish likely target locations (Clarke and 2012). Landscaping might be considered a securing prod- Newman 2006) . uct, for example. 2. Perform reconnaissance without being detected: Using security and securing products to protect the i. of suitable area(s) for leaving a vehicle-borne government complex makes for a secured complex, pro- device (including parking restrictions, parking tected by external means. But incorporating security or enforcement, normal parking activity, physical securing products or incorporating deliberate security security, closed-circuit television, and any blast adaptations can make the government complex an in- enhancing factors). herently secure one (Ekblom 2012). For example, a ii. of transport route(s) into suitable area. blast-resistant window is a securing component with the iii. of escape route(s) from suitable area. principal purpose to admit light while protecting against 3. Decide upon the most appropriate modus operandi the weather, and the subsidiary purpose to protect (probably only two main options): against blast effects. An example of a deliberate security i. Time delay device (long or short); Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 7 of 15 ii. Command initiation (remote or co-terminus abandoning the attack entirely, attacking another target (co-terminus = suicide)). (target substitution), or choosing a different attack mode 4. Gather detailed information to support modus (Meyer 2013). A standoff would, for example, protect operandi: against vehicle-borne explosives, while not being able to i. from personal contact; prevent any attack with a person-borne explosive. ii. from printed materials (books, newspapers, etc.); The technicalities section below discusses the technical iii. from the Internet; requirements for such standoff. iv. from first principles. 5. Locate suitable base from which to launch attack: Technicalities i. one’s own property; Describing the technicalities is primarily a task for future ii. a friend’s property; planning, but already now it is possible to set some ‘per- iii. a rented property; formance standards’ for the standoff (or buffer zone) be- iv. a derelict/ownerless property. tween general vehicle traffic and the FGC. 6. Consider personal security: The required distance between the perimeter bound- i. Counter-surveillance; ary and the FGC depends on many variables. These in- ii. Cover story; clude the threat level, that is, how much explosive force iii. Physical protection. security experts estimate that the attacker will be able to 7. Obtain suitable explosive materials/precursors generate, the importance and the quality of the site without being hurt or detected (probably three which must be protected, the buildings’ resilience to main options): blasts, and what sort of consequences we deem accept- Either able in case of a VBIED attack. i. purchased, or In addition to the distance requirements, the perim- ii. stolen, or eter boundary must be able to withstand the maximum iii. homemade from purchased or stolen precursors. speed a vehicle can reach at the perimeter. The maximum 8. Obtain information about how to assemble a device: speed depends on the surrounding areas. How is the road i. Purchase or steal necessary materials; system constructed? Can a vehicle use the roads to ac- ii. Purchase or steal necessary tools; celerate straight towards the boundary or will the road iii. Assemble device. system force the vehicle to slow down? Speed reduction 9. Obtain vehicle and other tools for transport and measures around the buffer zone, such as bumps and containment of explosive device without being curved roads, can therefore reduce the maximum force detected. the perimeter boundary must withstand. 10. Transport vehicle to target without being spotted The width between obstacles must, furthermore, not or challenged or explosives being detonated by be greater than 1.26 meters (Forman et al. 2009). If some accident. vehicles are to have access to the buffer zone, access 11. Find suitable spot for the explosive(s) and control is necessary. Electronic keys are a relatively easy (if necessary) for nearby viewing point for and inexpensive way to manage such access control, but detonation - without being spotted or challenged. unmanned gates are vulnerable to tailgating (sneaking a 12. Remove any physical obstacles at detonation site car in behind a legitimate user) and keys may go astray without being spotted or challenged. and are susceptible to hacking. For this reason, a guarded 13. Arm device and leave vehicle without being spotted gate is probably more secure. However, such a gate must or challenged. have protection that can withstand an accelerating vehicle, 14. Leave area or go to viewing point. and turning space for vehicles denied access (a rejection 15. Detonate device if command initiated (e.g. radio or line). The guards must also be protected to minimize the telephone controlled) without being spotted or possibility that they will be threatened or forced to open getting injured from explosion. the gate. Both above crime scripts highlight the need for finding a suitable site. A standoff that creates distance between Troublesome trade-offs an accessible spot and the target decreases the effect The above section shows why the FGC of Norway needs from the explosion upon the intended target and thus a standoff (buffer zone) between the government com- reduces the benefit of attacking. Crime participants seek, plex and general vehicle traffic. This measure has, how- however, to overcome the defences of their adversaries ever, more consequences than intended by the measure (Felson 2006). Instead of just accepting the reduced bene- and we refer to these consequences as externalities. This fit of attacking, the attacker might thus adapt; whether section accounts for these externalities and compares Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 8 of 15 them with the other purposes of the FGC to uncover required distance increases to 40 meters. A distance any ‘troublesome trade-offs’. requirement which distinguishes between two levels of security, where the ‘strict’ requirement of 40 meters will be Principal purpose employed for only a small part of the government complex, The principal purpose of the FGC is to provide long- makes for a relatively flexible government complex, where term, functional premises for the majority of the minis- most of the ministry function can be rearranged and/or tries, that is, the FGC must provide necessary space for moved within the complex. In other countries, the distance functioning ministries. The area available for building requirement varies more. For example, in Berlin, the au- the FGC is limited in extent. The quality assurance re- thorities distinguish between three threat levels for govern- port of the concept study demonstrated that if the FGC ment buildings. Only the three buildings with threat level 1 is to accommodate all the ministries for more than 50 (Bundestag, Bundeskanzleramt, and Bundesministerium years, the area must be densely developed (Berntsen et al. des Innern) have a required distance of a minimum of 50 2014). Using space for buffer zones leaves less space for meters to general vehicle traffic, and no streets have been development and makes it even more necessary to build closed off to general vehicle traffic outside other govern- denser and taller buildings in the remaining area, and can ment buildings (Metier, OPAK, LPO 2013). Differentiation make the FGC a less long-term solution. between government buildings lets the city keep more For a fully functional government complex, all legitim- streets open, but also makes the use of the government ate users, such as employees and visitors, need reason- buildings less flexible in case of changes in the ministry ably easy access. Introducing a buffer zone will make it structure. A possible solution to this dilemma is to install more difficult, if not impossible, for many users to access flexible barriers that close off streets only when govern- the FGC by car . Figures 2 and 3 displays two suggested ment functions that need the protection are located close government complexes where the government buildings to streets with general vehicle traffic. are marked in red and dashed lines mark the streets which the concept study recommends should be closed Security purpose off for general vehicle traffic. Figure 2 shows a reused A standoff between the FGC and general vehicle traffic version of the old government complex, while Figure 3 is a security measure aimed at vehicle-borne attacks. shows the current plans for the future government com- Such attacks are relatively rare in the Western world, plex (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). However, but the consequences can be significant should they suc- given the environmental policy objective to reduce ve- ceed. On a daily basis, other hazards, such as accidents hicle traffic in the city centre, such an obstacle might be and ordinary criminal incidents, can be more acute. positive. If legitimate users end up choosing to travel by In case of a life-threatening incident, emergency vehi- public transport, to walk, or to cycle, such a buffer zone cles need quick access to the area. A buffer zone might will contribute to fewer carbon emissions. Such an exter- delay such quick access. Good procedures to alert the nality might thus be called a positive externality. guards so they can be prepared to open the gates might Some legitimate users may have disabilities that make decrease such delays. Some incidents may also involve them dependent on motorized vehicles. To ensure that blocked gates (for example caused by collapsed build- they also have access, both the outdoor areas and close- ings). To ensure emergency-vehicle access in such inci- by public transport must be inclusively designed. dents, the buffer zone must have multiple access points. A fully functional government complex requires deliv- In case of fire, the fire department must have access eries. An external commodity reception where all items for all their cars to all major ‘fire attack paths’ (often the are inspected before they are forwarded to the govern- main entrance and stairways), with a maximum distance ment complex in security-cleared vehicles may ensure of 50 meters. In addition, the ground must be able to that deliveries do not compromise the buffer zone. This withstand the load of heavy fire engines and associated solution may also be both cost effective and environmen- supporting jacks. tally friendly. The FGC will have visitors that need extra security. For such visitors, waiting for access at the external per- Subsidiary purposes imeter may cause heightened risk of personal attacks. A Flexibility purpose gate to admit visitors with extra security needs must The concept study for the FGC formulated, as men- therefore be constructed to prevent personal attacks. tioned, the requirement that all government buildings should be situated a minimum of 20 meters from gen- Desire requirements eral vehicle traffic. For those parts of the government Representativeness complex containing national functions that are either The prime minister and other ministers regularly receive especially critical and/or under a heightened threat, the visitors from home and abroad and it is important for Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 9 of 15 Figure 2 The reused version of the Norwegian government complex with streets closed for general vehicle traffic (dashed lines) (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 10 of 15 Figure 3 The planned Norwegian government complex with streets closed for general vehicle traffic (dashed lines) (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 11 of 15 both the government and the rest of the state apparatus complex to be too long, compensatory measures must that the Norwegian government emerge with a culturally be implemented. representative government complex. This requirement Commerce depends on deliveries. If a buffer zone of representativeness applies to both inside areas and interferes with deliveries to neighbourhood commercial outside areas. How will the removal of almost all motor- businesses, alternative routes must be established. Some ized vehicles influence the representativeness of the out- commodities may also be transported without using a side areas? motorized vehicle. Streets with general vehicle traffic dominate outdoor Public transport, both underground and surface trans- areas in the city centre. However, motorized vehicles are port, is an essential part of a vibrant city centre. Some banned in some areas, such as pedestrian streets and public transport modes are underground, such as the park areas, thus providing greater design freedom for regular railway and the Oslo Metro, while others require those planning and designing the outdoor areas, and space on the surface and, thus, might be impeded by a creating opportunities for spaces that are more visually buffer zone. In Oslo city centre, both tram and bus lines pleasing. Consequently, a buffer zone that excludes mo- require surface space, and while current tram lines by- torized vehicles will probably increase the representa- pass the area designated for the FGC, conflict over a bus tiveness of outdoor areas. route which originally passed through the government A buffer zone around the government complex must, complex has already arisen. Even one bus route through as mentioned, be protected by barriers along the perim- a buffer zone creates specific security challenges: a bus is eter. Such barriers can be ugly, such as blocks of con- easy to obtain on the open market and could be turned crete, or pretty, such as reinforced planters. To ensure into a giant bomb disguised as a regular vehicle. In ad- the representativeness of the government complex, these dition, public transport depends on predictable condi- barriers should be designed to increase the attractiveness tions, and would suffer if heightened readiness were to of the outdoor areas rather than being ugly obstacles in cause disruptions in the regular schedule. the urban landscape. Removing motorized vehicles frees space, providing more space for other road users, such as pedestrians and Cost cyclists. Motorized vehicles might also limit vulnerable A buffer zone will, all things being equal, increase the road users’ mobility by being a ‘threat’ to them. Thus, by size of the FGC and thus increase its construction costs. reducing accessibility for motorized vehicles, such a buf- However, a buffer zone will reduce other security costs fer zone, might increase accessibility for pedestrians and related to protecting against VBIED attacks. For example, cyclists. a large standoff will reduce the required structural redun- dancy in buildings and thus reduce investment cost. Lack Environmental considerations of a standoff would also force security to continuously Removing vehicles will, as mentioned, have positive monitor all areas with vehicle access close to the FGC and environmental effects by encouraging a shift to more thus significantly increase security-related running costs. environmentally friendly transport. In addition, the buffer zone can be planted and thus provide green spaces for the ‘Hygiene’ or social-responsibility requirements densely built city centre. Even if social-responsibility requirements are mentioned last on the SFF’s list of purposes, the location of the FGC Preservation in a densely built city-centre area, affecting a vast number The Ministry of Environment emphasizes that cultural of neighbours and travellers, makes social-responsibility heritage is an important resource that must be protected requirements very salient. Different stakeholders, such and expanded even while cities are transforming. In as different governmental authorities, also disagree about other words, the conservation value of older structures which requirements are more important. must be considered when redeveloping the city. A chal- lenge with using older buildings for government pur- Accessibility poses is that they often are less space efficient than A buffer zone that excludes general vehicle traffic will newer purpose-built structures. Keeping old structures obviously impede ordinary motorists travelling into or will therefore have to be compensated for by increasing through the government complex. However, given the the outdoor space needed to build the FGC (Berntsen environmental policy objectives to reduce car traffic in et al. 2014). the city centre, reduced motorized traffic can also be positive. Some vehicle-access issues are, however, more External security needs salient than others. If a buffer zone causes emergency- For common citizens either travelling through the FGC service response times to neighbours of the government or just spending time in outside areas, other risks might Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 12 of 15 be more salient than the risk of a vehicle-borne attack maintenance should therefore not be neglected in the buf- against the government complex. For example, the risk fer zone. of robbery and/or rape might make citizens choose against using outside areas at night. Jane Jacobs’ concept Vibrant city centre of eyes on the street claims that movement through an To ensure that the area around the FGC is vibrant and area will create natural surveillance (Jacobs 1961), and that people choose to use the area, it is important that since criminals do not generally wish to be observed or both regular users and visitors perceive the area as at- apprehended, such surveillance can prevent crime. Intel- tractive, regardless of gender, age, income, or education. ligently designed landscape and lighting can promote Offering a variety of entertainment motivates people to natural surveillance from the interior of a building and spend time in public spaces. Removing general vehicle from the exterior by neighbours and passers-by (Cozens traffic might banish activities that rely on frequent deliv- 2002). Car occupants, cyclists, and pedestrians can func- eries. However, the buffer zone can also be used to pro- tion as eyes on the street, and if reduced driving through vide an attractive recreation area, such as a park with a the area is compensated for by increased cycling and skate ramp. In addition, buildings on the FGC’s fringe, walking, natural surveillance need not be diminished. It such as the old Oslo Public Library, can be redeveloped is, furthermore, likely that slow road users in the open as attractions for the greater population. A challenge here have a greater preventive effect than do passengers trav- would be to introduce attractions that do not sacrifice elling fast inside a vehicle. other security requirements, such as protection from in- The FGC will, as mentioned, face a wide range of risks. telligence gathering, for example, hostile reconnaissance The Government Administration Services will therefore using binoculars from high buildings. employ CCTV surveillance in their effort to handle these different risks. This monitoring capacity can also be Summary employed to detect crimes against citizens, such as rapes Table 2 summarizes both the challenges and the oppor- and robberies. If security personnel interrupt detected tunities connected with introducing a buffer zone with crimes and/or the information is used in subsequent reduced accessibility for motorized vehicles. investigation and prosecution, such CCTV can serve to increase the overall security of the protected area and to Discussion provide more security for general citizens using outdoor This paper has extended the use of the SFF from rela- areas. Use of this measure is likely to more than com- tively straightforward products, such as the Grippa Clip pensate for any reduced security caused by excluding and a railway carriage, to the many-faceted FGC. In vehicles. Meyer and Ekblom (2012), the authors assessed the Having fewer cars in the buffer zone will initially re- framework by discussing whether it (1) was clearly ex- duce encounters between vulnerable road users (pedes- pressed, (2) facilitated creativity, and (3) was practically trians and cyclists) and motorized vehicles. Fewer such applicable. After employing the framework in the FGC of encounters will also, other things being equal, lead to Norway, this paper’s authors would like to comment on fewer road accidents between vehicles and pedestrians. those three criteria. If vulnerable road users are unwary of motorized vehi- Our experience is that the SFF terms were relatively cles (risk compensation), the advantageous effect (a re- easy to employ when describing the FGC’s security func- duction in road accidents) of fewer cars is reduced. Such tion. It was not evident that a framework developed for risk compensation will, however, probably not entirely straightforward products would also work for such a eliminate the beneficial effect of decreasing the number many-faceted development, but we had no problems when of motorized vehicles. An increase of vulnerable road describing the security function. This study has thus rein- users in the area, however, can increase conflicts between forced the claim that the SFF is clearly expressed. cyclists and pedestrians, which might in turn cause more Meyer and Ekblom (2012) concluded, after a short dis- accidents between such road users. Fortunately, traffic ac- cussion, that the SFF facilitated structured creativity. In cidents involving only such users usually result in injuries the current case, the authors identified many of the con- of a less serious nature; therefore, an increase in such acci- crete challenges and opportunities before they employed dents will unlikely be large enough to remove the positive the SFF, partly since the framework was employed so impact on road safety of reducing the number of cars. late in the investigation. However, the framework forced Winter maintenance should not be neglected just the authors to rethink, and to connect the purposes because motorized traffic is reduced. For example, if foot- of the FGC to the challenges and opportunities, and paths are slippery, accidents might rise given possibly thereby made the underlying conflicting principles increased pedestrian and cycle traffic due to reduced mo- more evident. The SFF is therefore fertile in the sense that torized traffic. For the sake of remaining users, winter it structures the argument and clarifies the contact points Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 13 of 15 Table 2 Outline of challenges and opportunities/solutions Requirements Challenges Opportunities/solutions Primary purpose Space Less space for buildings Building denser Constructing taller buildings Functional Deliveries External commodity reception Reduced accessibility for disabled people Constructing areas that improve inclusive access Subsidiary purposes Flexibility Variable distance requirements Flexible barriers Internal security Emergency vehicle access Multiple access points Secure access for important visitors Protected access points Desire requirements Representative Ugly barriers Constructing barriers that increase the attractiveness of outdoor areas Social-responsibility requirements Accessibility General vehicle access Better pedestrian and bicycle access Deliveries Alternative routes and/or transport by non-motorized vehicles Public surface transport Increase underground transport Environmental concerns More environmentally friendly transport Green outdoor areas Preservation Less space-efficient use of land External security Fewer eyes on the street Employing formal surveillance to make other citizens feel safer Better road safety for the remaining road users Vibrant city centre Deliveries for attractions Using the buffer zone to create attractions between the different purposes, as well as offering a sys- SFF in the FGC of Norway will help illuminate these tematic approach to gather and systemize the relevant ‘troublesome trade-offs’. information. The analysis has demonstrated that standoff creates The FGC is a project that by all appearances will be challenges for other purposes of the FGC, such as func- realised, and the ideas formulated in this paper could tional office spaces for all employees, but many of these therefore be further tested during the development and challenges can be solved by planning intelligently, such as the building of the FGC. A brief look at Table 2 also creating an external commodity reception. Standoff also shows that all of the suggested solutions are possible to creates opportunities for reinforcing social-responsibility realise and could be implemented, given a positive polit- requirements, such as accessibility for pedestrians and ical climate. However, one of the main reasons for the environmental considerations. The current literature has solutions’ feasibility is that they seek to implement stake- mostly focused on negative externalities of security, while holders’ expressed wishes as revealed during the authors’ this paper demonstrates that security measures can have comprehensive information collection amongst the stake- both negative and positive externalities and that planning holders. The SFF can therefore aid in clear thinking and might alleviate some of the negative ones. The results, fur- structured creativity, but it cannot compensate for com- thermore, support Little’s (2004) notion about thinking prehensive information collection among different stake- holistically about protection to create robust and effective holders to ascertain their various perspectives by way of security, and show that the academic community can as- developing solutions that meet their requirements as sist in such holistic thinking. much as possible. The discussion showed that the SFF is expressed in terms that also can be employed in the multifaceted Conclusion FGC of Norway. The framework, furthermore, forced The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it explores the authors to rethink and connect the purposes of the various trade-offs between standoff and other values, FGC to the challenges and opportunities and made the and, when appropriate, proposes possible solutions to underlying conflicting principles more evident. The solu- such dilemmas. Second, it asks whether employing the tions proposed through this process were also practically Meyer et al. City, Territory and Architecture (2015) 2:8 Page 14 of 15 applicable, but one of the main reasons for the solutions’ Stavanger, Norway. Department of Economics and Logisticst, Institute of Transport Economics, Gaustadalleen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway. feasibility was probably the comprehensive information collection prior to employing the framework. Received: 3 September 2014 Accepted: 13 March 2015 This paper focuses on one measure, standoff, and explores the trade-offs between employing standoff and other purposes/values. All the dilemmas mentioned are therefore References Armitage R, Monchuk L (2009). Reconciling Security with Sustainability: The two-dimensional. Such dilemmas might, however, have even Challenge for Eco-Homes. Built Environment, 35(3):308–327. more than two dimensions. For example, Berntsen et al. Berntsen S, Sunde T, Rosseland KM, Johansen KW, Meyer SF, Jore SH, Aven T, (2014) have shown that some trade-offs have three dimen- Bratseth I, Finsveen J, Lolleng J, Steenberg G (2014) Fremtidig regjeringskvartal - Kvalitetssikring av beslutningsunderlag for konseptvalg sions, such as, for the FGC of Norway, the trade-off between (KS1). Dovre Group and TOI, Oslo enough office space, standoff, and preservation. Such City of Oslo (2014) Økt byliv i Oslo sentrum. 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Springer Berlin Heidelberg:153–164. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33161-9_22 Competing interests Gemzøe L (2006) Quality for People, a set of Quality Criteria for the Design of Part of this study has been funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Local Pedestrian Places and Networks: With People in Mind. Paper presented at Government and Modernisation. the “Next Steps”, the 7th International Conference on Walking and Livable Communities, Melbourne, Australia Authors’ contributions Jacobs J (1961) The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Vintage Books, Sunniva Meyer participated in the acquisition of data, employed the Security New York Function Framework on the case and drafted the manuscript. Sissel H. Jore Khajehpour S, Grierson DE (2003) Profitability versus safety of high-rise office buildings. and Kjell W. Johansen participated in the acquisition of data and helped Struct Multidisc Optim 25(4):279–293, doi:10.1007/s00158-003-0297-4 draft the manuscript. 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International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31 (3):155–184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsl.2003.09.002 Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from: 7 Convenient online submission 7 Rigorous peer review 7 Immediate publication on acceptance 7 Open access: articles freely available online 7 High visibility within the fi eld 7 Retaining the copyright to your article Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com

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