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Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition

Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition Some years ago, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich reported the results of experiments that reveal, they claim, cross-cultural differences in speaker’s ‘intuitions’ about Kripke’s famous Gödel–Schmidt case. Several authors have suggested, however, that the question they asked their subjects is ambiguous between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Machery and colleagues have since made a number of replies. It is argued here that these are ineffective. The larger lesson, however, concerns the role that first-order philosophy should, and more importantly should not, play in the design of such experiments and in the evaluation of their results. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Journals

Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition

Review of Philosophy and Psychology , Volume 9 (2) – Sep 13, 2017

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind; Cognitive Psychology; Neurosciences; Epistemology; Developmental Psychology; Philosophy of Science
ISSN
1878-5158
eISSN
1878-5166
DOI
10.1007/s13164-017-0362-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Some years ago, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich reported the results of experiments that reveal, they claim, cross-cultural differences in speaker’s ‘intuitions’ about Kripke’s famous Gödel–Schmidt case. Several authors have suggested, however, that the question they asked their subjects is ambiguous between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Machery and colleagues have since made a number of replies. It is argued here that these are ineffective. The larger lesson, however, concerns the role that first-order philosophy should, and more importantly should not, play in the design of such experiments and in the evaluation of their results.

Journal

Review of Philosophy and PsychologySpringer Journals

Published: Sep 13, 2017

References