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Should Abraham Get a Religious Exemption?

Should Abraham Get a Religious Exemption? Abstract The standard liberal egalitarian approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws implies that such exemptions may be necessary in the name of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. In each particular case this approach requires balancing the claims of devout believers against the countervailing claims of other citizens. I contend, firstly, that under the conditions of deep moral and ideological disagreement the balancing procedure proves to be extremely inconclusive. It does not provide an unequivocal solution even in the imaginary case based on the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice, not to speak of real-life cases that are far less suggestive. Secondly, I argue that it is possible to consider demands for religious exemptions respectfully, without even challenging the way they are justified, but still reject them for principled reasons—namely, because these demands cannot be met without arbitrarily bending popular sovereignty to the dictate of religious doctrines. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Res Publica Springer Journals

Should Abraham Get a Religious Exemption?

Res Publica , Volume 25 (2): 25 – May 1, 2019

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References (74)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2018 Springer Nature B.V.
ISSN
1356-4765
eISSN
1572-8692
DOI
10.1007/s11158-018-9398-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract The standard liberal egalitarian approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws implies that such exemptions may be necessary in the name of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. In each particular case this approach requires balancing the claims of devout believers against the countervailing claims of other citizens. I contend, firstly, that under the conditions of deep moral and ideological disagreement the balancing procedure proves to be extremely inconclusive. It does not provide an unequivocal solution even in the imaginary case based on the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice, not to speak of real-life cases that are far less suggestive. Secondly, I argue that it is possible to consider demands for religious exemptions respectfully, without even challenging the way they are justified, but still reject them for principled reasons—namely, because these demands cannot be met without arbitrarily bending popular sovereignty to the dictate of religious doctrines.

Journal

Res PublicaSpringer Journals

Published: May 1, 2019

Keywords: Political Philosophy; Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History; Political Theory; Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History; Ethics

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