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Russian Legal RealismOn Leon Petrażycki’s Critical Realism and Legal Realism

Russian Legal Realism: On Leon Petrażycki’s Critical Realism and Legal Realism [The author shows that Petrażycki adopted a form of critical realism, and that, despite him never using the exact term “legal realism”, his approach to legal phenomena can be regarded as a form of legal realism—if understood as critical realism applied to legal phenomena. In the first part of the chapter, the author presents Petrażycki’s critical realism. Here, his theory of perception and his conceptualization of deduction/induction as a scientific method (akin to Popper’s method) is presented. In the second part of the chapter, the author shows that Petrażycki’s theory of law, as well as his legal dogmatics and legal policy, should be all regarded as forms of legal realism. To this goal, after presenting Petrażycki’s distinction between objective-cognitive and subjective-relational sciences, the manner in which Petrażycki uses terms meaning “real”, “realist”, “realistic”, is examined. When reconstructing Petrażycki’s conception of legal dogmatics, the author also draws on Lande’s writings—the most consistent developer of Petrażycki’s ideas.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Russian Legal RealismOn Leon Petrażycki’s Critical Realism and Legal Realism

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library Book Series (volume 125)
Editors: Brożek, Bartosz; Stanek, Julia; Stelmach, Jerzy
Fittipaldi, Edoardo
Russian Legal Realism — Jan 8, 2019
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References (10)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018. Please tag and style the following sentence according to the specs for copyright comment:This publication has been prepared within the National Science Centre project UMO-2012/04/A/HS5/00655.
ISBN
978-3-319-98820-7
Pages
93 –109
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-98821-4_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The author shows that Petrażycki adopted a form of critical realism, and that, despite him never using the exact term “legal realism”, his approach to legal phenomena can be regarded as a form of legal realism—if understood as critical realism applied to legal phenomena. In the first part of the chapter, the author presents Petrażycki’s critical realism. Here, his theory of perception and his conceptualization of deduction/induction as a scientific method (akin to Popper’s method) is presented. In the second part of the chapter, the author shows that Petrażycki’s theory of law, as well as his legal dogmatics and legal policy, should be all regarded as forms of legal realism. To this goal, after presenting Petrażycki’s distinction between objective-cognitive and subjective-relational sciences, the manner in which Petrażycki uses terms meaning “real”, “realist”, “realistic”, is examined. When reconstructing Petrażycki’s conception of legal dogmatics, the author also draws on Lande’s writings—the most consistent developer of Petrażycki’s ideas.]

Published: Jan 8, 2019

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