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Questioning Two Assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects

Questioning Two Assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects There are at least two assumptions which, except for very few occasions, have not been discussed by philosophers who have written on the metaphysics of technological objects. The first assumption is that to be a technology is an absolute matter and that all technological objects are equally technological. The second assumption is that the property of being technological is abstracted from existing things which happen to have this property in common. I appeal to the definition of technological objects as problem-solving physical instruments to show that (i) things can be technological to different degrees, and that (ii) the property of being technological is more fundamental than being a technology. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy & Technology Springer Journals

Questioning Two Assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects

Philosophy & Technology , Volume 29 (2) – Apr 1, 2015

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy of Technology
ISSN
2210-5433
eISSN
2210-5441
DOI
10.1007/s13347-015-0198-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

There are at least two assumptions which, except for very few occasions, have not been discussed by philosophers who have written on the metaphysics of technological objects. The first assumption is that to be a technology is an absolute matter and that all technological objects are equally technological. The second assumption is that the property of being technological is abstracted from existing things which happen to have this property in common. I appeal to the definition of technological objects as problem-solving physical instruments to show that (i) things can be technological to different degrees, and that (ii) the property of being technological is more fundamental than being a technology.

Journal

Philosophy & TechnologySpringer Journals

Published: Apr 1, 2015

References