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Pluralist Partially Comprehensive Doctrines, Moral Motivation, and the Problem of Stability

Pluralist Partially Comprehensive Doctrines, Moral Motivation, and the Problem of Stability Abstract Recent scholarship has drawn attention to John Rawls’s concern with stability—a concern that, as Rawls himself notes, motivated Part III of A Theory of Justice and some of the more important changes of his political turn. For Rawls, the possibility of achieving ‘stability for the right reasons’ depends on citizens possessing sufficient moral motivation. I argue, however, that the moral psychology Rawls develops to show how such motivation would be cultivated and sustained does not cohere with his specific descriptions of ‘pluralist (partially comprehensive)’ doctrines. Considering Rawls’s claims that ‘most’ citizens—both in contemporary liberal democracies and in the well-ordered society—possess such doctrines, this incompatibility threatens to undermine his stability arguments. Despite the enormous importance of pluralist doctrines and the potential difficulties they pose for Rawls’s project, remarkably little attention has been paid to them. By critically examining these difficulties, the article begins to address this oversight. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Res Publica Springer Journals

Pluralist Partially Comprehensive Doctrines, Moral Motivation, and the Problem of Stability

Res Publica , Volume 23 (4): 21 – Nov 1, 2017

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References (33)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
ISSN
1356-4765
eISSN
1572-8692
DOI
10.1007/s11158-016-9335-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Recent scholarship has drawn attention to John Rawls’s concern with stability—a concern that, as Rawls himself notes, motivated Part III of A Theory of Justice and some of the more important changes of his political turn. For Rawls, the possibility of achieving ‘stability for the right reasons’ depends on citizens possessing sufficient moral motivation. I argue, however, that the moral psychology Rawls develops to show how such motivation would be cultivated and sustained does not cohere with his specific descriptions of ‘pluralist (partially comprehensive)’ doctrines. Considering Rawls’s claims that ‘most’ citizens—both in contemporary liberal democracies and in the well-ordered society—possess such doctrines, this incompatibility threatens to undermine his stability arguments. Despite the enormous importance of pluralist doctrines and the potential difficulties they pose for Rawls’s project, remarkably little attention has been paid to them. By critically examining these difficulties, the article begins to address this oversight.

Journal

Res PublicaSpringer Journals

Published: Nov 1, 2017

Keywords: Political Philosophy; Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History; Political Theory; Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History; Ethics

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