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[In the first chapter, I differentiated four questions hidden behind the label “personal identity”, including the distinction between the question of persistence and the specific way in which persons know about their own existence over time. This knowledge specific to persons will now also be discussed within the conception of personality. Thus the answer to the question of persistence proposed in the second chapter will be augmented by an aspect of first-personal biographical ‘identity’ that is specific to persons. This is based on the assumption that the specific way in which persons behave towards their own existence over time is manifested in the person’s personality. So the relation between personhood and personality can be determined in two ways. For one thing, one of the capacities necessary for personhood to be attributed will form the core of the personality: this is the knowledge of persons about their own identity over time and their ability to take a stance towards their own temporally extended existence. For another, one can understand the personality of an individual as the respectively individual way of using the properties and capacities accompanying the personhood to cultivate an own biography and to lead an own ‘personal’ life. Personhood denotes a status attributed equally to every individual qua person, if he adequately fulfills the required conditions. In contrast, personality denotes the respective individual shaping of the personhood which is manifested in an individual biography (cf. Quante 2012, Chapter 8).]
Published: May 25, 2017
Keywords: Personal Identity; Complex Theory; Critical Reflection; Autonomous Action; Personal Autonomy
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