Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Nothing Good Will Come from Giving Up on Aetiological Accounts of Teleology

Nothing Good Will Come from Giving Up on Aetiological Accounts of Teleology Philos. Technol. (2012) 25:543–546 DOI 10.1007/s13347-012-0079-2 COMMENTARY Nothing Good Will Come from Giving Up on Aetiological Accounts of Teleology John Basl Received: 2 May 2012 /Accepted: 9 May 2012 /Published online: 24 May 2012 # Springer-Verlag 2012 . . . Keywords Synthetic biology Synthetic organisms Artifactual organisms Aetiological account of function One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they force us to reconsider a central dogma of environmental ethics, namely that there is some fundamental difference between artifacts and organisms such that the latter have goods or interests of their own that are due moral consideration while the former do not. The creation of entities that are at the same time artifacts and organisms forces us to clarify and reflect on existing accounts of the metaphysical and moral distinctions many envi- ronmental ethicists have wanted to make between entities of these kinds. In “Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology”, Sune Holm (2012) explores the challenge that synthetic or fully artifactual organisms raise for one of the most prominent accounts that supports the central dogma just described. While various environmental ethicists have attempted to ground the interests, goods, or welfare of non-sentient organisms in http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy & Technology Springer Journals

Nothing Good Will Come from Giving Up on Aetiological Accounts of Teleology

Philosophy & Technology , Volume 25 (4) – May 24, 2012

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/nothing-good-will-come-from-giving-up-on-aetiological-accounts-of-IUBn9V0mkx

References (8)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer-Verlag
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy of Technology
ISSN
2210-5433
eISSN
2210-5441
DOI
10.1007/s13347-012-0079-2
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Philos. Technol. (2012) 25:543–546 DOI 10.1007/s13347-012-0079-2 COMMENTARY Nothing Good Will Come from Giving Up on Aetiological Accounts of Teleology John Basl Received: 2 May 2012 /Accepted: 9 May 2012 /Published online: 24 May 2012 # Springer-Verlag 2012 . . . Keywords Synthetic biology Synthetic organisms Artifactual organisms Aetiological account of function One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they force us to reconsider a central dogma of environmental ethics, namely that there is some fundamental difference between artifacts and organisms such that the latter have goods or interests of their own that are due moral consideration while the former do not. The creation of entities that are at the same time artifacts and organisms forces us to clarify and reflect on existing accounts of the metaphysical and moral distinctions many envi- ronmental ethicists have wanted to make between entities of these kinds. In “Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology”, Sune Holm (2012) explores the challenge that synthetic or fully artifactual organisms raise for one of the most prominent accounts that supports the central dogma just described. While various environmental ethicists have attempted to ground the interests, goods, or welfare of non-sentient organisms in

Journal

Philosophy & TechnologySpringer Journals

Published: May 24, 2012

There are no references for this article.