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Literature, Politics and Law in Renaissance EnglandAmici curiae: Lawful Manhood and Other Juristic Performances in Renaissance England

Literature, Politics and Law in Renaissance England: Amici curiae: Lawful Manhood and Other... [In the course of a discussion of the ethics of friendship, Jacques Derrida makes a curious and seemingly offhand remark: ‘One has no friendship for law.’1 His immediate point is that the classical teneritas amicitiae or fondness of friendship has no place in law. Friendship is a relation to a person, law administers things. Within the Western tradition, and specifically within the scholastic and highly legalistic doctrine of friendship that we inherit from a Latinate past, it is secrecy and subjectivity that make the bond of friendship and it is precisely that subjective bond that must be given up by all who enter the portals of law. In a paradoxical sense, it has long been the case and continues to be the case that the ideal-type of the lawyer is that of someone estranged from both friendship and personhood. The lawyer acts for persons, persons speak through or are represented by lawyers, but the fate of the advocate or orator, of Nietzsche’s epigone, the filing clerk, the jurist, is that they are friendless, that at root they are alone.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Literature, Politics and Law in Renaissance EnglandAmici curiae: Lawful Manhood and Other Juristic Performances in Renaissance England

Part of the Language, Discourse, Society Book Series
Editors: Sheen, Erica; Hutson, Lorna

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References (1)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2005
ISBN
978-1-349-43051-2
Pages
23 –49
DOI
10.1057/9780230597662_2
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In the course of a discussion of the ethics of friendship, Jacques Derrida makes a curious and seemingly offhand remark: ‘One has no friendship for law.’1 His immediate point is that the classical teneritas amicitiae or fondness of friendship has no place in law. Friendship is a relation to a person, law administers things. Within the Western tradition, and specifically within the scholastic and highly legalistic doctrine of friendship that we inherit from a Latinate past, it is secrecy and subjectivity that make the bond of friendship and it is precisely that subjective bond that must be given up by all who enter the portals of law. In a paradoxical sense, it has long been the case and continues to be the case that the ideal-type of the lawyer is that of someone estranged from both friendship and personhood. The lawyer acts for persons, persons speak through or are represented by lawyers, but the fate of the advocate or orator, of Nietzsche’s epigone, the filing clerk, the jurist, is that they are friendless, that at root they are alone.]

Published: Nov 16, 2015

Keywords: Public Sphere; Nicomachean Ethic; Legal Tradition; Legal Subject; Lawful Manhood

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