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/lp/springer-journals/legal-personhood-animals-artificial-intelligence-and-the-unborn-why-EWu3HDLYrS
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- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Copyright
- © Springer International Publishing AG 2017
- ISBN
- 978-3-319-53461-9
- Pages
- 69 –89
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6_5
- Publisher site
- See Chapter on Publisher Site
Abstract
[The chapter argues that the traditional theories of legal personhood, which associate legal personhood with the holding of rights, are outdated and should be reassessed. Many modern theories of rights come into conflict with our convictions regarding who or what is a legal person. For instance, most jurists would agree that foetuses are not natural persons but new-born children are. However, if we apply the so-called interest theory of rights, we will note that foetuses hold various rights, such as rights against certain forms of abortion. If right-holding entails legal personality, then foetuses are already legal persons. On the other hand, if we apply the will theory, which associates right-holding with the power to control others’ duties, then infants do not hold any rights at all – and are consequently not legal persons.]
Published: Mar 24, 2017
Keywords: Right; Thing; Person; Legal person; Hohfeldian analysis