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Intrinsic Properties Defined

Intrinsic Properties Defined PETER VALLENTYNE (Received in revised form 24 April 1996) Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing’s having it (at a time) depends only on what that thing is like (at that time), and not on what any wholly distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like. A property is extrinsic just in case it is non-intrinsic. Redness and squareness are intrinsic properties. Being next to a red object is extrinsic. Distinguishing intrinsic from extrinsic properties is important for at least two reasons. First, we want to distinguish real change from mere Cambridge change. A change in intrinsic properties is a real change in an object, whereas change in extrinsic properties isn’t. Second, we want to distinguish qualitatively, but not numerically, identical objects (i.e. duplicates) from numerically identical objects. Distinct duplicate objects, we want to say, share all their intrinsic properties, but not all their extrinsic properties. (For reasons given below, this second desideratum is reasonable only if somewhat modified.) Giving a precise and adequate definition of intrinsicness has turned out to be extremely difficult. David Lewis, for example, has criticized a definition of intrinsic properties developed by Jaegwon Kim (who was building on one by http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophical Studies Springer Journals

Intrinsic Properties Defined

Vallentyne, Peter
Philosophical Studies , Volume 88 (2) – Sep 29, 2004
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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language
ISSN
0031-8116
eISSN
1573-0883
DOI
10.1023/A:1004250930900
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

PETER VALLENTYNE (Received in revised form 24 April 1996) Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing’s having it (at a time) depends only on what that thing is like (at that time), and not on what any wholly distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like. A property is extrinsic just in case it is non-intrinsic. Redness and squareness are intrinsic properties. Being next to a red object is extrinsic. Distinguishing intrinsic from extrinsic properties is important for at least two reasons. First, we want to distinguish real change from mere Cambridge change. A change in intrinsic properties is a real change in an object, whereas change in extrinsic properties isn’t. Second, we want to distinguish qualitatively, but not numerically, identical objects (i.e. duplicates) from numerically identical objects. Distinct duplicate objects, we want to say, share all their intrinsic properties, but not all their extrinsic properties. (For reasons given below, this second desideratum is reasonable only if somewhat modified.) Giving a precise and adequate definition of intrinsicness has turned out to be extremely difficult. David Lewis, for example, has criticized a definition of intrinsic properties developed by Jaegwon Kim (who was building on one by

Journal

Philosophical Studies – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 29, 2004

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