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How crosslisting affects merger and acquisition activity

How crosslisting affects merger and acquisition activity Consistent with crosslisting decreasing the cost of capital, we find that firms which issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are much more likely to undertake an acquisition than non-crosslisted firms. The results do not appear to be driven by self-selection, as the increase in acquisitions is robust to a Heckman correction as well as to a fixed-effect analysis. Adding the home country’s shareholder rights to the analysis, we find that crosslisted firms increase their takeover activity primarily if they are from weak shareholder rights countries. This evidence is consistent with crosslisting reducing the cost of capital of firms from weak governance countries significantly, and this reduction in cost of capital allows these firms to pursue more domestic and international takeovers. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

How crosslisting affects merger and acquisition activity

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References (38)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Finance/Investment/Banking; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
DOI
10.1007/s11156-012-0279-y
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Consistent with crosslisting decreasing the cost of capital, we find that firms which issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are much more likely to undertake an acquisition than non-crosslisted firms. The results do not appear to be driven by self-selection, as the increase in acquisitions is robust to a Heckman correction as well as to a fixed-effect analysis. Adding the home country’s shareholder rights to the analysis, we find that crosslisted firms increase their takeover activity primarily if they are from weak shareholder rights countries. This evidence is consistent with crosslisting reducing the cost of capital of firms from weak governance countries significantly, and this reduction in cost of capital allows these firms to pursue more domestic and international takeovers.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Mar 2, 2012

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