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Chapter 6 Inthe present part of this studyIshall sketch thechoice of the truthbearer in the framework of two theories which are included under the name of ‘reism’. Both theories express their authors’ metaphysicalbeliefs regarding what exists intheworld; both, however, being ontologies, have different reasons for those beliefs: Brentano’s theory can be seen as a resultofhis mereological ontology of mind, whereas Kotarbinski’ ´ ´ s theory can be seen as a metaphysical interpre- tation of Lesnie ´ ´ wski’s ontology. Brentano adopted reism around 1908 and Ko- tarbinski ´ ´ in the second half of the 1920’s. Yet both reisms arose independently of one another. This isan interesting fact since bothbelong to the same philo- sophical tradition which comes from the so-called ‘early Brentano’. It iseven more interesting that, considering the different concepts of truth (Brentano’s criteriological conception of truth and Kotarbinski’ ´ ´ s correspondence theory of truth), their results as far as truthbearers are concerned are similar in many respects. What isalso worth mentioninginthe lightof the previous investi- gation is that both reisms can be seen as ontologies of judgment. From this point of view Brentano’s reism would be a theory of judgers which relies on the ontology
Published: Jan 1, 2005
Keywords: Spea King; Logical Sense; Truth Bearer; Assertive Force; Accor Ding
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